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ABSTRACT
Online video streaming applications enable users to watch
over-the-air broadcast programs at any time and almost on any
device. As such, they challenge the pertinence of traditional video distribution law and the broadcast network system on which it
is based. Congress enacted the Transmit Clause of the 1976
Copyright Act to resolve the high-stakes tussle between broadcasters and cable providers. But, today, that provision is illsuited to resolving whether unauthorized streaming infringes on
broadcasters’ copyright to perform works publicly. Its scope is
ambiguous enough that judges across the country were notably
divided on whether it reaches online video distribution—that is,
until the Supreme Court ruled that it does in a divided opinion
last term in ABC v. Aereo.
Remarkably, none of the courts to address the question, including the Supreme Court, consulted the interpretations of video distribution law by the agencies to which Congress delegated the
broad authority of doing so in closely related statutes. The courts
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assumed that they alone should interpret the scope of the Transmit Clause in the absence of a specific delegation from Congress
to an agency to interpret the provision.
This Article argues that courts instead should consult all of the
public law that Congress set in motion in the area of video distribution law before resolving novel disputes over the scope of the
Transmit Clause. This reform would have purchase when, as is
the case today, the Copyright Office and the Federal Communications Commission have authority to interpret online video distribution under the Copyright Act and the Communications Act,
respectively. Although neither agency has the authority to interpret the Transmit Clause, current administrative law doctrine
suggests that those agencies’ interpretations of closely related
statutes are worthy of respect, if not deference. This Article accordingly argues for a more careful approach to substantive judicial review in this area than the courts have employed.
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INTRODUCTION
Today’s popular retail internet applications are completely different
from the mass market communication technologies that preceded them.
Twentieth century broadcasting empowered audiences to tune in together to
live and recorded performances. It dramatically enlarged the size of audiences that could experience live and recorded programming simultaneously.
Broadcast television in this regard was the great hearth of American culture
for most of the twentieth century. 1 The major networks were to be the trustees of the public airwaves that curated every minute of programming for
the mass public in order to keep viewers interested.
As transformative as broadcasting was, however, the Internet has
turned the political economy and cultural practices of video distribution inside out. Today, audiences are not so beholden to broadcast programmers.
Current video distribution technologies have unmoored performance from
time and place so that each viewer is in far more control over when and
how she watches television programs than she was before. Viewers can
now experience performances at the time and in the order of their choosing
on almost whatever networked device they wish.
With so much in flux, after years at the center of the mass communication political economy, the broadcast incumbents today act as though they
have everything to lose. They have done almost everything in their power
to moderate the disruptive effects of online video distribution.
One of the primary resources to which they have turned to retain their
market position is public law. They have done so in at least three ways.
First, they have lobbied Congress to enact statutes or amend existing ones
to account for new technologies as they emerge. Congress accordingly has
added new exclusive copyrights and amended the scope of existing ones
with specific technologies in mind. Second, the incumbents have petitioned
the pertinent administrative agencies to adopt interpretations of existing law
that further secure their market position. Pursuant to their delegated authority under the Copyright Act and the Communications Act, respectively, the
Copyright Office and the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”)
1. See SUSAN J. DOUGLAS, LISTENING IN: RADIO AND THE AMERICAN IMAGINATION
(2004); J. FRED MACDONALD, ONE NATION UNDER TELEVISION: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF
NETWORK TV (1993).
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routinely hear such petitions and comments in proceedings involving novel
communications technologies. Third, the incumbents have challenged the
emergent technologies in court, relying on interpretations of existing law
that inure to their benefit. It is to this strategy—appeal to courts—on which
I focus in this Article. The majority and dissenting opinions in the United
States Supreme Court’s American Broadcasting Companies v. Aereo, Inc. 2
decision from this past June provide an important opportunity to assess how
courts might address technological novelty in the absence of clarity in existing public law. There, broadcasters argued that an upstart online video distributor infringed on their copyright to “perform” works “publicly” when it
made broadcasters’ programs available without authorization. The Court
agreed with broadcasters.
Rather than focus on the substantive outcome of the litigation, I focus
here on the interpretive strategies that the courts (the majority and dissenting opinions in Aereo in particular) have employed to make sense of the
Transmit Clause, 3 a provision that Congress wrote well before any of its
members knew anything about networked communications, let alone online
video streaming. Judges, I will show, were silent on efforts by the Copyright Office and the FCC to make sense of online video streaming in proceedings involving related provisions in the Copyright Act and the Communications Act. They assumed that courts alone could or should make
sense of a statutory provision absent a specific delegation to the agencies to
interpret the provision.
The courts’ silence is remarkable at least because judges have long
recognized that they are not always good at making legal sense of disruptive communication technologies. To be sure, sometimes they can, should,
and do define legal obligations and rights in the first instance, without consulting other institutions. Adjudications concerning the scope of individual
constitutional rights like privacy or fact-dependent considerations like copyright fair use, for example, are the province of the courts. 4 Judges in these
cases are not and should not be any more reticent to resolve disputes involving disruptive technologies than they are for conventional ones.
In other legislative fields, however, courts are careful not to impose
their interpretations of existing statutes without first consulting institutions
created for that very purpose. Scholars generally associate this reticence

2. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2012).
4. It is worth noting here that, although fair use is explicitly defined in the Copyright Act,
observers have generally recognized it to be a judge-created doctrine that is only really elaborated
in adjudication. I discuss the fair use doctrine below. See infra notes 277–281 and accompanying
text.
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with deference. 5 Deference has a special meaning in administrative law
doctrine, referring generally to courts’ relative high regard for agency conclusions. 6 For constitutional law and legal process scholars, the concept of
deference is a trans-substantive idea that connotes respect for the formal authority or decisionmaking capacity of other institutions. 7
In both kinds of cases—those where they decide in the first instance
without consulting other institutions and those in which they actively defer
to agencies—courts are almost always explicitly mindful of the limits of
their institutional authority and capacity to resolve disputes involving novel
communication technologies. I argue here that, in the recent online video
distribution cases on the scope of the Transmit Clause, courts should have
been far more respectful than they were of recent and ongoing proceedings
at the Copyright Office and the FCC on how to treat those technologies under sister provisions in the Copyright Act and the Communications Act.
Courts, as it turns out, are not the only ones that jump the gun to resolve substantive policy disputes. Legal commentators, too, have sometimes been far too eager to determine what the “proper balance” between
content owners, innovators, and users ought to be. 8 To be sure, some information law scholars have remarked on the relative institutional roles that
legislatures, agencies, and courts play in resolving disputes involving networked communications. 9 But scholars have avoided or been silent on the
point in the context of video distribution.
5. See generally LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACT 320 (1965).
6. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Skidmore
v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
7. See Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 765–66 (1997); Eric Berger, Individual Rights,
Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L.
REV. 2029, 2032–33 (2011); Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1061, 1072 (2008); Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common
Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 483 (2010) (referring to the “ordinary” components of administrative law as “statutory and regulatory requirements, such as the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) or Executive Order 12,866 and associated administrative law doctrines”); Robert A.
Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and Federal Constitutional
Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656 (2000); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein
& Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885 (2003).
8. See, e.g., Mary Rasenberger & Christine Pepe, Copyright Enforcement and Online File
Hosting Services: Have Courts Struck the Proper Balance?, 59 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 627,
631 (2012); Sebastian Wyatt Novak, Note, “A Million Little Antennas:” The Second Circuit’s Decision in WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., and the Next Great United States Supreme Court Copyright Battle, 16 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 287 (2013).
9. See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257
(2007) (using the theory of economic externalities to posit a theory of IP property rights distribution); Thomas Fetzer & Christopher S. Yoo, New Technologies and Constitutional Law, in
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 485 (Mark Tushnet, Thomas Fleiner & Cheryl Saunders eds., 2013); Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007
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The problem with this myopic focus on substantive policy outcomes is
that it has a very narrow view of what the Internet is. I assume here that it
is far more than an innovation machine.10 The Internet constitutes and inhabits all aspects of our public and private lives. Parties accordingly are
now more than ever asking courts to resolve high-stakes disputes like those
at issue in the Aereo litigation because innovation is an indeterminate objective. What is more, these disputes involve competing public policy priorities and interests for which there is often no easy answer in existing law.
The focus on substantive policy outcomes accordingly ignores the far more
relevant question today of how to make legal sense of laws when novel
communication technologies like live video streaming emerge and the pertinent existing public laws provide no clear answer. I propose here a reform
that would have courts leave these problems to Congress and the agencies
to whom it has delegated the responsibility of resolving such questions in
the first instance. This Article considers the recent video distribution cases
and Aereo in particular to explain the point.
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I illustrate that, in the
recent online streaming video cases, courts proceeded in their analysis of
the public performance right on the assumption that they are best situated to
resolve questions about novel technologies. I focus in particular on the recent litigation involving Aereo.
In Part II, I situate the Transmit Clause in its historical and legislative
context. I show that it was just one part of a broader reform addressed to
the emergence of cable television and the consequent shift in the political
economy of broadcast programming distribution. I also show that Congress
later amended the Copyright Act as well as the Communications Act to account for the emergence of disruptive video programming distribution technologies. And while it has incorporated the Internet and networked communications technologies in these amendments, I show that Congress has
yet to amend the scope of broadcast transmission law to include the Internet. Instead, Congress has deferred that responsibility to the Copyright Office and the FCC. And, accordingly, both agencies have had a thing or two
to say about broadcasters’ relative rights in the market for online video dis-

STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, at ¶ 30 (2007); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 805–06, 855 (2004);
Gideon Parchomovsky & Philip J. Weiser, Beyond Fair Use, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 96 (2010);
Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 751 (2005); Philip J. Weiser, Internet Governance,
Standard Setting, and Self-Regulation, 28 N. KY. L. REV. 822 (2001); A. Michael Froomkin,
Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50
DUKE L.J. 17 (2000); Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164
(2004); Jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 395 (2009).
10. Cf. Olivier Sylvain, Network Equality, 67 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2015).
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tribution. 11 These agency findings, I argue, should make courts far more
sanguine than they have been about deciding the scope of the public performance right de novo, as though they are the only act in town.
In Part III, I demonstrate that courts already have developed an appreciation for the limits of their relative institutional authority and capacity in
other information law subfields like electronic communication surveillance
and broadband network management. This underscores the inadequacy of
the courts’ approach to the public performance right. Thus, later in Part III,
I propose that courts interpose interpretations by the Copyright Office and
the FCC concerning the proper legal treatment of online video streaming
under the sister provisions of the Copyright Act and the Communications
Act. That is, I propose that courts defer to those agencies’ conclusions as
they would to agencies that have the specific delegated authority to interpret
statutes in the first instance. In the end, my argument here is for more humility in courts’ consideration of disputes concerning disruptive video distribution technologies than they have evinced to this point.
I. AEREO AND THE CASE OF ONLINE VIDEO STREAMING
Viewers today have far more control over when and how they watch
television sitcoms, dramas, live sports, and movies than they did a generation ago. 12 User adoption of digital video recorders like TiVO and DVR
cable service is not the only reason. Networked devices manufactured by
Simple.tv and Roku, internet-based video-on-demand applications like
those offered by Hulu and Amazon, and “over-the-top” online video services like those being developed by Sony and Verizon enable users to
watch live or record-and-playback television programming whenever and
however they want. 13 According to one recent report, subscribers with
high-speed internet connections now outnumber those with cable television. 14
Until last summer, online streaming video distribution applications
like Aereo and FilmOn were at the vanguard of such services. Aereo transcoded over-the-air broadcast signals into a digital form for subscribers who,
11. The Copyright Office, for example, does not think the compulsory licensing law under
the Copyright Act, the sister provision of the public performance right, covers internet transmissions. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SATELLITE HOME VIEWER EXTENSION AND REAUTHORIZATION
ACT SECTION 109 REPORT (2008), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/section109final-report.pdf.
12. See Alex Williams, For Millennials, the End of the TV Viewing Party, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/09/fashion/for-millennials-the-end-of-the-tv-viewingparty.html?smid=nytcore-ipad-share&smprod=nytcore-ipad&_r=0.
13. Id.
14. Shalini Ramachandran, More Cable Companies Take TV Off Menu, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 3,
2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/more-cable-companies-take-tv-off-menu-1412120310.
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in turn, wanted to watch on their laptops or other mobile devices. For many
observers, however, Aereo’s online streaming service was nothing more
than a tool used by its developers to exploit broadcasters’ proprietary content without paying for it. 15 Accordingly, broadcast networks and their affiliated local stations filed lawsuits across the country alleging that Aereo
and FilmOn infringed their exclusive right under the Copyright Act to perform broadcast programs publicly. 16 In many regards, the broadcasters’
strategy proved very successful: Aereo has shuttered its business and filed
for bankruptcy at the end of 2014. 17
The problem is that the pertinent provision, the Transmit Clause of the
1976 Copyright Act, 18 is not particularly clear about how courts ought to
consider user-controlled video applications like Aereo. The statute’s definition of what constitutes a public performance is inapposite to the workings
and predominant consumer uses of online video. 19 Congress, after all,
drafted it in an era when broadcasters controlled the time and manner by
which the public watched broadcast fare. 20 Aereo ostensibly did something
new; their subscribers could watch broadcast network sports or TV dramas
in whatever idiosyncratic way they chose: they could watch live or watch at
a later time from any point in the program. 21 And they could do all of this
on virtually any device that has an internet connection.22
The Transmit Clause is ambiguous enough on the question that judges
across the country were divided on how to handle the various cases that
15. Cf. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974) (broadcasters
brought suit against cable operators for violating public performance right under 1909 Copyright
Act); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968) (same); Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, No. Civ.A. 00-121, 2000 WL 255989 (W.D. Pa. 2000)
(broadcasters brought suit against first generation of online streaming video sites).
16. See, e.g., Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014); Fox Television Stations v. FilmOn X LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2013); Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 874
F. Supp. 2d 373, 386–87 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
17. See infra note 120.
18. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012) (public performance right); 17 U.S.C. § 101(2)(2012)
(providing that to perform publicly under § 106 of the Copyright Act is “to transmit or otherwise
communicate a performance or display of the work . . . to the public, by means of any device or
process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times”).
19. See supra note 18.
20. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012)).
21. See Jerry Markon, Robert Barnes, & Cecilia Kang, Supreme Court Rules Against StartUp Aereo, Saying It Is Violating Copyright Laws, WASH. POST (June 25, 2014)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/supreme-court-rules-against-startup-aereo-saying-it-isviolating-copyright-laws/2014/06/25/59756f88-fc6b-11e3-8176-f2c941cf35f1_story.html
(explaining that Aereo rebroadcasts live television at a cheap monthly rate, where the subscribers can
access these programs more conveniently).
22. Id.
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broadcasters brought. 23 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit and a district court in Massachusetts decided that the provision does
not include the new applications, while district courts in the District of Columbia and California decided that they do.24
The United States Supreme Court agreed to hear the case on appeal
from the Second Circuit in January of this year and, in a 6–3 decision, sided
with broadcasters. In his opinion for the majority, Justice Breyer likened
Aereo to cable service, the video distribution technology that Congress explicitly brought under coverage of the 1976 Copyright Act. 25 The “behindthe-scenes way in which Aereo delivers television programming to its
viewers’ screens” was unknown to policymakers in 1976, but the general
act of retransmitting broadcast signals to subscribers without authorization
was. 26
Justice Scalia, writing for the three dissenters, rejected the analogy to
cable, choosing instead to liken Aereo’s service to a “copy shop” that allows customers to use a copier on its premises.27 Such stores would not be
infringing any more than Aereo is.28
As interesting as the substantive question about the scope of protection
under current law is or ought to be, both the majority opinion and dissent
overlooked the important role that federal agencies play in the legislative
field. The Copyright Office and the FCC have for decades been applying
the Copyright Act and the Communications Act, respectively, to disruptive
video distribution technologies. For better or worse, Congress long ago decided that these agencies are best situated to understand new video applications as they emerge, monitor their impact on the market, and recalibrate the
scope of legal protections in furtherance of legislative purposes. 29 They are
charged with making legal sense of new technologies in the first instance.30
The Justices and all of the federal judges who have heard the question,
however, showed no respect for this arrangement. Indeed, neither the Aereo
majority opinion nor the dissent even acknowledged it. They instead chose
to interpret the scope of the public performance right without any real con-

23. See, e.g., WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013).
24. Compare id., with Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 30
(D.D.C. 2013).
25. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2506 (2014) (“This history makes clear
that Aereo is not simply an equipment provider. Rather, Aereo, and not just its subscribers, ‘perform[s]’ (or ‘transmit[s]’). Aereo’s activities are substantially similar to those of the CATV companies that Congress amended the Act to reach.”).
26. Id. at 2508.
27. Id. at 2513 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 2513–14.
29. See infra Part II.
30. See infra Part III.
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sideration of the agencies’ findings or reports on the question.31 I posit here
that they did so based on the myopic assumption that they alone have the
duty of finding the proper balance between owners and creators in the first
instance—or at least that they are as well situated as anyone else to make
legal sense of disruptive new technologies. 32
A. The Aereo Service
Aereo streamed over-the-air broadcast programming to its paying subscribers. 33 The company relied on three important design features to provide the service. First, it assigned an individual antenna to a subscriber
once it received a request from that subscriber to watch or record a program. 34 Subscribers would make their request by clicking a computer
mouse or tapping their mobile device’s display. 35 No two users would
share the same antenna at the same time, even if they requested to watch or
record the very same program at the same time. 36 Second, Aereo transcoded the broadcast signal of the requested program and created an individual digital copy of that program in the requesting subscriber’s personal directory. 37 Again, even when two users are watching or recording the same
program at the same time, the stream that they receive through Aereo flows
from the copy of the program in their own Aereo directory. 38 Finally, a
subscriber could watch the copy of the desired program on his TV, computer, or mobile-device screen; no other Aereo user could ever view that particular copy. 39 In short, Aereo afforded users control over when and
through which device they watched programs. 40 And it did so without authorization from broadcasters.
Aereo designed their service in this way in order to abide by the terms
of the Second Circuit’s decision in a 2008 case involving a cable television
remote storage digital video recorder service (“RS-DVR”). 41 Cablevision,
the principle defendant in that case, provided subscribers with RS-DVR

31. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2504–11.
32. See infra Part I.D.
33. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2503.
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See id.
39. Id.
40. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing
expert reports); see also Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the
Delivery of Video Programming, 24 FCC Rcd. 4401, 4408 (2009).
41. Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) (referred
to colloquially as “Cablevision”).

Sylvain Final Proof

2015]

DISRUPTION AND DEFERENCE

725

service to copy and transmit broadcast and nonbroadcast programming. 42
The Cablevision panel concluded that this service did not constitute a public
performance within the meaning of the Copyright Act because, first, individual subscribers make their own copy of a broadcast network program
through a click of their remote control and, second, the RS-DVR service automatically transmits that individual copy to the unique subscriber whenever the latter requests it. 43 Cable operators have virtually no active role in an
automated individual transmission.
As novel as its service seemed, Aereo’s entry into the market was not
terribly surprising. First, applications for online streaming of broadcast and
nonbroadcast television content had been available for years already. 44
Second, cable companies and broadcasters already were engaged in a very
fraught battle over licensing and retransmission terms in ways that disadvantaged consumers. Specifically, broadcasters and other programmers
blacked out their signals to gain leverage in their negotiations over retransmission. 45 Aereo simply sought to capitalize on the dispute, advertising itself as the modern-day alternative to the old and greedy incumbents. 46
Legislators in Congress, meanwhile, had been (and continue to be)
considering bills that would address online video distribution. One bill
would forbid cable and satellite operators, broadband providers, and other
major media companies from engaging in anticompetitive practices against
online video distributors, effectively giving the latter the same protections
afforded to satellite providers.47 It would also open the possibility for
online video distributors to negotiate with broadcasters on streaming terms.
The basic objective of this proposal is to afford users a mix of choices for
video programming. The House Committee on Energy and Commerce,
meanwhile, released a white paper that detailed current inadequacies in the
42. Id. at 124.
43. In a useful analogy, the Cablevision court likened RS-DVR service to a store that charges
customers to use a photocopier on-site. Id. at 132. As with such a store, Cablevision could not be
held liable for violating plaintiffs’ rights under the Copyright Act because RS-DVR service automates subscriber requests, effectively removing any volitional conduct on the part of Cablevision.
Id.
44. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, No. Civ.A. 00-121, 2000 WL
255989 (W.D. Pa. 2000).
45. See Christopher Zara, Fox News Blackout Takes a Bite Out of Dish Network’s Pay-TV
Subscribers, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.com/fox-news-blackouttakes-bite-out-dish-networks-pay-tv-subscribers-1827108.
46. Aereo took out a full-page New York Times advertisement to emphasize the point. Greg
Sandoval, News War: Aereo Takes out Full-Page New York Times Ad as Network Threats Heat
up, THE VERGE (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.theverge.com/2013/4/18/4238774/aereo-takes-outfull-page-new-york-times-ad-against-network-threats.
47. Consumer Choice in Online Video Act, S. 1680, 113th Cong. (2013); cf. Bryce Baschuk,
Rockefeller Unveils Aereo Friendly Online Video Legislation for Expanded Choice, BLOOMBERG
BNA (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.bna.com/rockefeller-unveils-aereo-n17179880063/.
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amended Communications Act, focusing in particular on the way in which
the 1934 Act treats different communications platforms (i.e., broadcasting,
cable, and wireless) differently. 48
B. The Lawsuit
Broadcasters, however, were not going to wait for legislative action.
The major networks and their affiliated local stations in the largest television markets sued Aereo and FilmOn, another prominent online video
streaming service, within a year after those services first became available.
In cases filed in federal district courts in New York, Boston, Los Angeles,
Washington, D.C., and elsewhere broadcasters alleged that Aereo and
FilmOn directly infringed on broadcasters’ right to perform their programs
publicly every time the upstarts streamed broadcast content without permission. 49
The pertinent statutory provision of the Copyright Act, the Transmit
Clause, defines the right to perform work “publicly” as,
[the right] to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance
or display of the work . . . to the public, by means of any device
or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in
separate places and at the same time or at different times. 50
According to plaintiffs, Aereo’s method of distributing broadcast programming to subscribers violates the plain terms of the statute. It makes no difference, they alleged, if Aereo uses one big antenna (like a cable company,
for example) or many small antennas to receive broadcast signals if, in either case, the company is retransmitting the same program to members of
the public. 51

48. H. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, MODERNIZING THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT
(2014),
available
at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/analysis/Co
mmActUpdate/20140108WhitePaper.pdf (“The primary body of law regulating these industries
was passed in 1934 and while updated periodically, it has not been modernized in 17 years.”).
49. WNET Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages at ¶¶ 43–48, Am. Broad. Cos. v.
Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2012) (No. 12 Civ. 1543) (citing 17 U.S.C.
§§ 106(4), 502 (2012)). American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (“ABC”) and WNET were coplaintiffs in a suit against Aereo, Inc. Aereo, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 375–76. WNET also alleged infringement of their reproduction right under the Act as well as unfair competition, WNET Compl.,
supra, at ¶¶ 49–63, but the public performance claim drew the most attention. See also WNET,
Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 683 (2d Cir. 2013).
50. 17 U.S.C. § 101(2). For the purposes of the act, “publicly” refers to “at any place where
a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances
is gathered.” Id. § 101(1).
51. WNET Compl., supra note 49, at ¶ 3.
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The district courts to hear the cases were of two minds: some were inclined to reject plaintiffs’ suit, while others were alarmed by the new online
video applications at issue. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied broadcasters’ motion for a preliminary injunction, relying on the Second Circuit’s opinion from 2008 in Cablevision. 52 It found that the similarities between the RS-DVR service in that
earlier case and Aereo’s streaming service were significant. The latter’s
subscribers, it explained, can stop, store, and playback programs in the
same way that cable subscribers can control video through DVR service.53
A few months later, the United States District Court for the District of Boston reached the same conclusion.54
Broadcasters found success in cases in D.C. and California. A judge
in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, for
example, found that FilmOn infringed broadcasters’ public performance
right. 55 Explicitly rejecting the Second Circuit’s reading of the Transmit
Clause in Cablevision, the L.A.-based court explained that the underlying
work and its transmission are not separate “performances” under Section
101; the statute is addressed to “the performance of the copyrighted work,
irrespective of which copy of the work the transmission is made from.” 56
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia found the California court’s reasoning persuasive, but nevertheless provided its own rationale for its decision. 57 That court also imposed a nationwide injunction
on online video streaming services like those provided by FilmOn and
Aereo, excepting, of course, the states in the Second Circuit. 58 The California district court for its part had limited its injunction to the Ninth Circuit.59

52. Am. Broad. Cos., 874 F. Supp. 2d at 386–87. Plaintiffs chose not to pursue their reproduction right at the preliminary injunction stage. See id. at 376 (discussing the limited scope of
the opinion).
53. Id. at 386.
54. See Hearst Stations Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 2d 32, 38 (D. Mass. 2013).
55. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC, 915 F. Supp. 2d
1138, 1143–44 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (discussing Cablevision). It decided the case before the Second
Circuit published its opinion in April 2013.
56. Id. at 1144. FilmOn appealed the district court decision to the Ninth Circuit. In light of
Ninth Circuit precedent with which the Second Circuit explicitly disagreed in Cablevision, see
Cablevision, 536 F.3d 121, 138–39 (2d. Cir. 2008) (distinguishing On Command Video Corp. v.
Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1991)), it was probable that the two most
prominent federal appellate courts on intellectual property matters would have been split on the
scope of the public performance right. Such a split never came to pass, however, as the Ninth Circuit stayed the case before it pending the Supreme Court’s resolution of the appeal from the Second Circuit.
57. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 30, 33, 37, 44–52
(D.D.C. 2013).
58. Id. at 52.
59. See BarryDriller, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1148.
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Aereo, meanwhile, filed defensive lawsuits across the country, seeking to
stave off the broadcasters’ expensive no-holds-bar litigation strategy. 60
Broadcasters appealed the adverse decisions. Even while most federal
courts across the country had not endorsed the Second Circuit’s Cablevision
approach, broadcasters could not tolerate an adverse decision in the jurisdiction with the largest television market. 61 They also fine-tuned their argument, focusing in particular on the live streaming aspect of Aereo’s service (as opposed to the record-and-playback function). 62
A divided Second Circuit panel affirmed the district court’s decision. 63
The user control features of Aereo’s online streaming service, it held, are
sufficiently similar to make Cablevision dispositive as a matter of stare decisis. 64 The panel explained that, under Cablevision, the “to the public”
language in the Transmit Clause refers to the potential audience for the
original transmission and not to the underlying program. 65 The provision,
it explained, cannot be read to include any and all transmissions of the same
underlying program because such a reading could transform even private
transmissions into public ones—say, when a viewer watches the program
on another device in her house through her home network. 66 To allow such
a reading, the panel explained, would effectively render the “to the public
language” superfluous. 67 The only performance addressed in the provision,
it explained, is created by the original act of transmission from broadcaster
to the airwaves, not to the subsequent transmissions triggered by the user’s
request to play a recorded copy of the original transmission.68 The court
reasoned that, as in Cablevision, Aereo enables unique users to receive and
watch their own transmission of the desired broadcast.69
The Aereo panel also briefly examined the text and history of the
Transmit Clause. Echoing Cablevision, it explained that Congress explicitly addressed the provision to “the emergence of cable television systems” in
60. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Aereo, Inc. v. CBS Broadcasting, No. 13CV-3013 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2013).
61. See Brian Stelter, Aereo Wins Court Battle, Dismaying Broadcasters, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
1,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/business/media/aereo-wins-in-appeals-courtsetting-stage-for-trial-on-streaming-broadcast-tv.html?_r=0 (“The broadcasters, surprised and disappointed, said they were confident they would prevail eventually.”).
62. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2506 (2014) (“This history makes
clear that Aereo is not simply an equipment provider. Rather, Aereo, and not just its subscribers,
‘perform[s]’ (or ‘transmit[s].’)”).
63. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 686–87, 696 (2d Cir. 2013).
64. Id. at 695.
65. Id. at 687 (citing Cablevision, 536 F.3d 121, 135–36 (2d Cir. 2008)).
66. Id. at 688.
67. Id. at 687–88 (citing Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 135–36).
68. Id. at 688–89 (citing Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 138).
69. Id. at 689–90.
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the late 1960s and early to mid-1970s. 70 Congress made their intentions all
the clearer, moreover, when, at the same time, it created a whole new compulsory licensing regime that would enable “cable systems” to retransmit
broadcast programming. 71 Together, the panel explained, the Transmit
Clause and Section 111 were to moderate the high-stakes contest between
broadcasters and cable operators.72 Congress, the panel continued, did no
such thing for any other video distribution technologies at that time; it did
not express any sense for how to structure a broad and all-inclusive statutory licensing regime that could accommodate “unanticipated technological
developments” like online video streaming. 73 The design of the Aereo service could not have been anticipated. 74 And this was not a small point for
the panel: the difference between “public and private transmissions” in the
1970s “was simpler than today.” 75
Judge Denny Chin wrote a forceful dissenting opinion. 76 He agreed
that Congress incorporated the public performance right and corollary compulsory licensing regime in the 1976 Copyright Act in order to address cable retransmission of broadcast signals. 77 But, he continued, the majority’s
decision privileges form over substance as it would allow unauthorized retransmissions through “a Rube Goldberg-like contrivance, overengineered . . . to avoid the reach of the Copyright Act.” 78 For him, Cablevision is inapplicable because the RS-DVR service in that case supplements the real-time service for which cable systems pay statutory licensing
fees under Section 111 and retransmission consent fees under the Communications Act. 79
In any event, Judge Chin continued, Congress explicitly sought to incorporate “all conceivable forms and combinations of wires and wireless

70. Id. at 685 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 63 (1976), as reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5676).
71. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (2012)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 694–95.
74. Id. at 694.
75. Id. at 694–95.
76. Id. at 696 (Chin, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 704; cf. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974)
(holding that cable service that retransmitted broadcast signal outside local area was not a public
performance within the meaning of the 1909 Copyright Act); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists
Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968) (holding that cable operator’s retransmission of broadcast
signal is not a public performance within the meaning of the 1909 Copyright Act).
78. Aereo, 712 F.3d at 697 (Chin, J., dissenting). It is worth mentioning here that, in Cablevision, the Second Circuit reversed then-District Court Judge Chin’s decision for broadcasters.
Cablevision, 536 F.3d 121, 140 (2d Cir. 2008).
79. Aereo, 712 F.3d at 697 (Chin, J., dissenting); see also 47 U.S.C. §325(b)(6) (2012).
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communications media” in their definition of “transmit.” 80 Congress, he
argued, had a broad conception of public performance that, according to the
legislative history, included any transmissions to the public, no matter
whether individuals can watch and record at different times or in different
places. 81 While it did not foresee video streaming over the Internet, he conceded, Congress surely meant to include streaming in their definition of
public performance under Section 101. 82
The Aereo majority’s short response to the dissent was that, after Cablevision, “technical architecture matters.”83 The majority noted the plaintiffs’ argument that Aereo in all likelihood designed its system with that
earlier case in mind—that is, its engineers quite plainly designed around the
concerns that the Second Circuit identified in Cablevision. 84 But that, the
majority continued, was not itself incriminating; this is not the first time
that a company has developed a business plan or designed an information
sharing technology with an eye to existing law. 85 Aereo provided just one
of many emergent cloud computer services that Cablevision had arguably
instigated. 86 Like those other services, the panel suggested, the company
merely enables subscribers to control how they watch broadcast programs. 87
C. The Supreme Court
The plaintiffs in the Second Circuit case filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari that the Supreme Court promptly granted early in 2014. 88 The
Court heard argument in the case in April and, a couple months later, reversed the Second Circuit in a 6–3 decision. 89
The majority, in an opinion by Justice Breyer, was not as taken by the
uniqueness of Aereo’s design as the Second Circuit panel majority had
been. 90 Aereo’s one user, one antenna design, it explained, does not make
the transmission less “public” for the purposes of the Transmit Clause.91
80. Aereo, 712 F.3d at 701 (Chin, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 64
(1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678).
81. Id. at 698–99.
82. Id. at 698.
83. Id. at 694 (majority opinion).
84. Id. at 693–94.
85. Id. at 694.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 692.
88. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). Interestingly, Aereo did not object to the petition. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13461 (Oct. 11, 2013). Plaintiffs had filed a motion for rehearing with the full Second Circuit that
the court promptly rejected. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 722 F.3d 500 (2d Cir. 2013).
89. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2511.
90. Id. at 2507–08.
91. Id. at 2501.
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The peculiar “behind-the-scenes way in which Aereo delivers television
programming to its viewers’ screens” does “not render Aereo’s commercial
objective any different from that of cable companies.” 92 The company’s
service, it explained, does not “significantly alter the viewing experience of
Aereo’s subscribers.” 93 The Transmit Clause’s language was not addressed
solely to the original performance of the underlying work, the majority continued, but to every manner in which that underlying work is conveyed to
members of the public. 94 Congress made this clear, the majority explained,
by asserting in the statute that a public performance occurs “whether the
members of the public capable of receiving the performance . . . receive
it . . . at the same time or at different times.” 95 In this regard, the Court noted, Congress specifically sought to overturn two prior Supreme Court opinions in which the Court refused to hold cable operators liable for violating
the public performance rights of broadcasters under the old statute. 96 In the
1976 statute, the majority continued, Congress sought to impose liability on
operators as well as subscribers for performing work—that cable operators
were not merely making equipment available to viewers, but also impermissibly transmitting signals to viewers.97
Accordingly, the Court explained, since Aereo “performs” broadcast
programs “publicly” in the same way that cable operators do, it is bound by
the same provisions of the Copyright Act—that is, neither Aereo nor any
other online video distributors like it may retransmit broadcast signals
without broadcasters’ authorization.98
The majority limited the scope of its holding in the face of concerns
from amici and others that a decision against Aereo might also impose unintended restrictions on cloud computing services generally. 99 The distinction between the online video distribution at issue and other internet-based
services was not hard to make: unlike the latter, the majority explained,
Aereo’s subscribers do not have any proprietary interest in the underlying
works that Aereo makes available.100 The Transmit Clause “does not extend to those who act as owners or possessors of the relevant product”; it
could only be addressed to “cable companies and their equivalents.” 101
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
5676).
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 2508.
Id.
Id. at 2509.
Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2505–06.
Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 63 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
Id. at 2511.
Id. at 2518 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2510 (majority opinion).
Id.
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This means that, at a minimum, the provision covers entities that “communicate[] . . . contemporaneously perceptible images and sounds” of a
work in the same way that cable providers do. 102 In any event, the majority
observed, the fair use doctrine provides a fail-safe mechanism against “inappropriate or inequitable applications of the Clause.”103
Justice Scalia authored a dissenting opinion that Justices Thomas and
Alito joined. In it, he rejected the majority’s conclusion that Aereo could
directly infringe on broadcasters’ performance rights if subscribers, not
Aereo, trigger the transmission of the underlying work. 104 The right question, he argued, was instead about the scope of secondary liability, not direct liability. 105 This is an important distinction, Justice Scalia explained,
because Aereo does not engage in volitional conduct. 106 Its “automated, user-controlled system,” he continued, places the decisive volitional conduct
in the hands of the subscriber.107 Aereo, for its part, Justice Scalia concluded, does not have the requisite amount of intentionality to be directly liable
for direct infringement. 108 He reasoned that it “does not ‘perform’ for the
sole and simple reason that it does not make the choice of content.” 109 This
is far different, he noted, than the cable services that gave rise to the Transmit Clause in 1976. 110 Those services, Justice Scalia explained, actively defined the video content they supplied to subscribers.111
In the end, Justice Scalia reserved his most caustic criticism for the
majority’s “guilt by resemblance” approach to copyright law.112 Among
other things, he observed, the House Report to which the majority only cited once could not be reflective of congressional intent at the time. 113 In any
event, he explained, the majority’s decision to turn “performance” on a “cable-TV-lookalike rule” does not provide much clarity for other online video
distribution services. 114

102. Id. at 2509.
103. Id. at 2511.
104. Id. at 2512–13 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 2514.
106. Id. at 2512–13.
107. Id. at 2513.
108. Id. at 2514.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2515.
111. Id. at 2515–16.
112. Id. at 2515–17.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2516. Justice Scalia posited that the “cable-TV-lookalike rule” as such would not
resolve whether a record-and-playback service like that offered by Aereo (but not on review on
appeal) infringes on broadcasters’ public performance right. Id. at 2516–17. Under current law,
however, that sort of “time shifting” would likely be a permissible fair use. The majority seemed
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D. Agency Work (or, What the Aereo Opinions Did Not Mention)
The authors of the majority and dissenting opinions reached their conclusions in the absence of any clear precedent on the question of how
broadly the public performance right reaches. Justice Breyer thought it was
important to identify and make sense of the Transmit Clause’s general legislative purpose in the context of the new technology. 115 He wondered
whether Aereo’s service was much different from cable, and concluded that
it was not. 116 It did not matter that online video streaming was unknown to
lawmakers in 1976. He just presumed that, under the Copyright Act, users
must have an underlying relationship with the work in question in order to
avoid liability under the Transmit Clause, although no court has ever required as much.
Justice Scalia’s dissent, on the other hand, was characteristically dismissive of the use of legislative history as a methodology for interpreting
the meaning of the Transmit Clause. 117 He determined that the semantic
meaning of the operative verb in the Transmit Clause—“perform”—
required a volitional act on the part of the alleged infringer even though, not
unlike the majority opinion, the Supreme Court has never adverted as
much. 118
In this regard, the Breyer and Scalia opinions in Aereo were just the
latest installments in the longstanding feud between the two about judicial
interpretive approach. They were both unwaveringly confident in their authority to make legal sense of the new technology without consultation of
anything more than the statute and their own interpretive methodology. 119
This preoccupation was put in full relief in the Aereo case because
federal agencies—that is, important institutional interpreters of public law
other than courts—have over the past decade or so sought to clarify how to
treat online video distributors under the Copyright Act or the Communications Act. The Copyright Office, as I explain in more detail in Part III below, has for over the past decade repeatedly observed that online video dis-

to agree as much with this point. Accord id. at 2511 (majority opinion) (citing Sony Corp. of Am.
v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984)).
115. Id. at 2502–10.
116. Id. at 2507. Courts have often felt compelled to make analogies to conventional communications technologies in order to make legal sense of the internet. This has the unfortunate effect
of underappreciating the novel particularities of the specific online service or application at issue.
117. Id. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting)(referring to “the severe shortcomings” of reliance on
legislative history as an “interpretive methodology”).
118. But see Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’ns Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“Although copyright is a strict liability statute, there should still be
some element of volition or causation which is lacking where a defendant’s system is merely used
to create a copy by a third party.”).
119. See supra Part I.C.
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tributors are not “cable systems” within the meaning of Section 111 of the
Copyright Act, the sister provision of the Transmit Clause. Those agency
decisions clearly are at odds or at least inconsistent with the majority’s decision in Aereo. The FCC for its part has been administering a proceeding
on whether online video distributors owe the same duties to broadcasters
that cable operators and other multichannel video programming distributors
(“MVPDs”) do. As with their silence on the Copyright Office’s implementation of Section 111, the Justices’ omission of these proceedings borders
on remarkable. The Justices’ silence on the role that these agencies have
been playing since the advent of the online video distribution is all the more
notable in light of the fact that both Justices Breyer and Scalia are former
scholars and teachers of administrative law.
To put the matter more starkly: neither Aereo opinion gave any consideration to whether the courts are the right or best institutions for deciding
how to treat online video streaming in the face of so much agency work on
the matter. The Justices took for granted that they are. And, as it goes, they
were not alone. None of the other trial or appellate courts to hear the cases
against Aereo or FilmOn before the Supreme Court’s decision last summer
gave any meaningful consideration (never mind deference) to agency actions on the matter. 120
My argument here is that courts should, as a matter of course, attend to
the agencies that Congress set in motion in the Copyright Act and the
Communications Act. Courts and information law scholars have attended
to the relative institutional roles that legislatures, agencies, and courts play

120. See supra Part I.B. After the Supreme Court decision, Aereo sought to amend its pleadings to allege that it qualified for a compulsory license under Section 111. Joint Letter of Parties
at 3 (July 9, 2014) (No. 12-cv-1540), available at http://blog.aereo.com/2014/07/3784/. In the
litigation that led to the Supreme Court decision, Aereo had argued that it could not qualify as a
cable system. The company thought it could invoke the provision as an affirmative defense to
broadcasters’ motion for an injunction, particularly after the Supreme Court held that Aereo is like
a cable system for the purposes of the Transmit Clause. It argued that, if they are a cable system
under the Copyright Act, they are entitled to the benefits of the statutory license under 111(c). It
accordingly filed statements of account and royalty fees with the Copyright Office. The agency
promptly rejected the request. “[I]nternet retransmissions of broadcast television,” it explained,
“fall outside the scope of the Section 111 license.” Letter from General Counsel and Associate
Register of Copyrights, Jacqueline C. Charlesworth, United States Copyright Office, to Matthew
Calabro,
Aereo,
Inc.
(July
16,
2014),
available
at
http://www.nab.org/documents/newsRoom/pdfs/071614_Aereo_Copyright_Office_letter.pdf. The
company filed for bankruptcy soon afterward. Tanya Agrawal & Jonathan Stempel, Video
streaming service Aereo files for bankruptcy, REUTERS (Nov. 21, 2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/21/us-aereo-bankruptcy-idUSKCN0J513K20141121. In
spite of this filing, broadcasters continue to prosecute their substantive infringement claim. See
Broadcasters’ Motion for Relief from Stay Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) and Memorandum of
Law, In re Aereo, Inc., Case No. 14-13200 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), available at
http://ia601409.us.archive.org/12/items/gov.uscourts.nysb.254268/gov.uscourts.nysb.254268.47.0.
pdf.
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in resolving disputes arising from disruptive networked communications
technologies in a variety of other substantive legislative fields.121 No one,
however, has done so for the public performance right. To the extent legal
commentators have written about the online video streaming cases, they focus on what the right substantive policy ought to be; they ask whether
courts have struck the proper balance between content owners, innovators,
and the public. 122
That this has been the narrow focus of scholarship is no surprise. The
preoccupation with finding the best positive substantive outcome (irrespective of legal process and governance) is the staple of information law scholarship. The most enduring (and celebrated) law review article in the area
argued that policymakers ought to promulgate more than statutory prohibitions because today’s software writers and computer engineers are demonstrably too wily to be daunted by them. 123 Legislators and policymakers,
this scholar argued, ought to implement “soft” forms of regulation that foster innovation. 124
But, today, over three decades since its commercialization, the Internet
is far more than an innovation machine that policymakers must regulate delicately. 125 Today, as is quite evident in the growth of the market for online
video, the Internet is now fully integrated into public life. At least for now,
the transmission protocol on which the Internet is based is the dominant
means of distributing information. 126 Parties are now more than ever asking
courts to resolve high-stakes communication technology disputes in a varie-

121. See, e.g., Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 9; Fetzer & Yoo, supra note 9; Freiwald,
supra note 9; Kerr, supra note 9; Mazzone, supra note 9; Parchomovsky & Weiser, supra note 9;
Solove, supra note 9.
122. See, e.g., Novak, supra note 8; Rasenberger & Pepe, supra note 8, at, 641–43.
123. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113
HARV. L. REV. 501, 513–14 (1999); see also Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 554–55 (1998)
(“[L]aw and government regulation are not the only source of rulemaking. Technological capabilities and system design choices impose rules on participants. The creation and implementation of
information policy are embedded in network designs and standards as well as in system configurations.”).
124. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 2.0 175 (2006) (“Code can, and increasingly will, displace law
as the primary defense of intellectual property in cyberspace. Private fences, not public law.”);
see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 184 (1999); Joel R.
Reidenberg, supra note 123, at 554–55.
125. Cf. Sylvain, supra note 10.
126. See, e.g., Order, Technology Transitions, 29 FCC Rcd. 1433 (2014) (ordering experimentation for the transition from traditional time-division multiplexed circuit-switched voice services
to an Internet protocol based voice service).
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ty of settings presumably because there is no obvious answer to what the
proper policy balance ought to be. 127
The overwhelming focus on substantive policy outcomes ignores the
far more pertinent question today of how courts ought to make legal sense
of laws when technologies change and prevailing public law objectives are
in tension. These are difficult questions to answer. They are all the trickier
for judges when sophisticated and well-resourced public interest groups,
trade associations, and transnational conglomerates bring to bear their own
interests to the question.
Congress delegated first-instance policymaking authority to the Copyright Office and the FCC precisely for these reasons. Courts accordingly
have deferred to those agencies (under Chevron, for example) for the same
reasons. 128 This is why the Aereo opinions are so remarkable; the Justices
evinced no awareness of this background.
The Aereo case accordingly provides an opportunity to consider the
ways in which courts might develop a more careful approach to making legal sense of disruptive technologies when statutes are ambiguous. I outline
in Part III what such an approach would look like. In short, I argue that
courts ought to determine at the outset, before deciding the substantive
question, whether the agencies that Congress has charged with filling in
gaps in video distribution law have addressed or are in the process of addressing the matter. 129 Before setting out the contours of this proposal,
however, I show in Part II below that the Copyright Office and the FCC
have, indeed, been very active in the legislative field of video distribution
for decades.
II. VIDEO DISTRIBUTION LAW IN FOCUS
Contemporary legal disputes involving novel communications technologies generally arise from disagreements between individual users, entrepreneurs, and engineers over the meaning or scope of existing public law.
It is no surprise that new technologies could trigger such heated, highstakes disagreement. The original language and purpose of laws concerning

127. See, e.g., Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Viacom Int’l v. Youtube, Inc.,
676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012); Agape Church, Inc. v. FCC, 738 F.3d 397 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
128. City of Arlington, Texas v. FCC, , 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013) (applying Chevron deference
to the FCC’s rulemaking on cellphone tower siting provision in the Communications Act); WPIX,
Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 279-85 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying Chevron and Skidmore deference
to Copyright Office’s findings regarding §111 of the Copyright Act). See generally GOLDSTEIN
ON COPYRIGHT, § 3.20, n.7 (3d Edition 2005) (observing that, while “[c]ircuits divide on the deference to be given to the Copyright Office[,] . . . some courts give so-called ‘Chevron deference’”).
129. See infra Part III.C.
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networked communications were not designed to address modern-day realities.
Courts employ different interpretive strategies to resolve such disputes
depending on the nature of the particular statutory provision at issue and in
consideration of the applicable institutional constraints. On the one hand,
they might take it upon themselves to resolve a matter in the first instance
without consulting anyone else. Or, on the other hand, they might consult
or defer to other institutions (i.e., administrative agencies) on the assumption that the latter are better suited to resolving such disputes in the first instance than courts are.
But, in Aereo, the Supreme Court did not evince any awareness that
they had a choice in the matter. Neither the majority nor the dissent gave a
moment’s consideration to whether it (or any federal courts) should defer to
or even consider the work of the Copyright Office or the Federal Communications Commission on video distribution law.130 They presumably believed that it was their responsibility to resolve the contest between broadcasters and the developers of online video distribution applications, in spite
of the regulatory regimes that Congress created solely for that purpose. To
give some context for this glaringly immodest view of their relative institutional role, here, in this Part, I outline the public law that they ignored.
A. The History and Political Economy of Video Distribution
Broadcast radio and television have played an important role in defining American public life for several decades now. But Congress enshrined
the political economy of broadcast distribution in the Radio Act of 1927,
and then the Communications Act of 1934. 131 In both, broadcasters were to
be the vital trustees of the public airwaves. A station could only obtain a
license to use a frequency in the electromagnetic spectrum if it could
demonstrate to the FCC (and the Federal Radio Commission before it) that
it would act in the public interest. 132
This regulatory arrangement was the backdrop for the advertisingbased broadcast network system of the twentieth century. The major broadcast networks entered into exclusive agreements with local station affiliates
across the country to distribute original programming. The networks and
their affiliates supported this system by selling time during the airing of
their programs to advertisers. Audience size translated into revenue; the
bigger and more captive the audience, the greater the revenue to broadcasters.

130. See supra Part I.C.
131. See Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162; Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064.
132. See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
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The popularity of programming was therefore essential to the flow of
revenue. The major studios did everything they could to keep audiences
coming back for more. Daytime programming was important, of course.
But, in this scheme, the most lucrative airtime was (and, for broadcasters,
still is) in the evening: primetime, after people had come home from work
and eaten dinner.
American viewers generally abided by this schedule, organizing their
waking lives around weekly listings in TV Guide and the local newspaper.
Television was the great electronic hearth by which viewers, together, enthusiastically basked in a shared American culture. Anchormen like Walter
Cronkite supplied reassurance during difficult times. Popular episodic
comedies like The Honeymooners and I Love Lucy made fun and sense of
the times. The American public experienced primetime television in one
sitting as a single community. Of course, there were minorities, outliers,
and dissenters who did not follow mainstream television programming. 133
For the most part, however, broadcast television was an important galvanizing force in American life.134
The Internet and online video in particular have dramatically redefined
the way in which viewers interact and watch video programming. 135 Of
course, broadcast television programming continues to play an important
part in American popular culture today. Just ask the contestants on Dancing with the Stars or any one of the Real Housewives. But it does not occupy the defining position in the culture that it once did. The key difference is
that viewers more than ever watch video content on their laptops and mobile phones at the time of their choosing. 136 At a minimum, the attraction of
live or prime time television as such is not as salient to young adult viewers. 137
To be clear, online streaming of broadcast programming has existed
for only a little more than a decade.138 It still comprises a small fraction of

133. Olivier Sylvain, Contingency and the “Networked Information Economy”: A Critique of
The Wealth of Networks, 4 INT’L J. TECH., KNOWLEDGE & SOC’Y 203 (2008).
134. Cf. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (1982).
135. See Tim Wu, Netflix’s War on Mass Culture, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 4, 2013),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/115687/netflixs-war-mass-culture.
136. See generally Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, 24 FCC Rcd. 4401, 4406–09 (2009) (discussing Slingbox and other
technological innovations).
137. NIELSEN COMPANY & THE COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH EXCELLENCE, OUT OF HOME
TELEVISION AND OTHER VIDEO VIEWING BEHAVIORS OF U.S. ADULTS: RESULTS FROM THE
COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH EXCELLENCE VIDEO CONSUMER MAPPING STUDY (2010).
138. See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, No. Civ.A. 00-121, 2000 WL
255989 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (finding for broadcasters in suit challenging web-based transmission of
U.S. over-the-air programs to viewers in the United States via a Canadian website).
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TV viewing today. 139 But so much more seems to be at stake today, as the
number of online video viewers will continue to increase in the coming
years. 140
The popularity of online video content has grown so much over just
the past decade or so that it is now cutting into markets long dominated by
broadcasters. Companies like Hulu, Amazon, and Netflix have for the past
seven or so years supplied internet-enabled platforms for streaming episodic
shows and feature films. In the past two years, they have developed their
own critically acclaimed original episodic programs like House of Cards
and Orange is the New Black and feature films like Mitt. 141 And, of course,
YouTube and Vimeo provide internet-based platforms for user-generated
video content. Cable programmers like HBO, too, are now getting in the
game, promising to deliver their premium content to online streamers who
do not subscribe to cable. 142
Online streaming of broadcast programming poses one of the biggest
threats to the traditional political economy of video production and distribution. It is no wonder that Nielsen, the audience measurement firm, now includes mobile devices in its analysis of TV audiences. 143 News, moreover,
that Comcast, the cable television giant, entered a special “peering” arrangement with Netflix earlier this year to manage the latter’s high bandwidth traffic to users portends quite a fundamental restructuring of the video distribution market. 144

139. Alex Kantrowitz, Are Advertisers Spending Too Much on Online Video?, ADVERTISING
AGE (Sept. 11, 2013), http://adage.com/article/digital/nielsen-online-video-consumption-tinycompared-tv/244084/.
140. Associated Press, Cord Cutting a Trend? Nielsen to Begin Counting Online Streaming,
CBS NEWS (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/cord-cutting-a-trend-nielsen-to-begincounting-online-streaming/.
141. Cf. Agape Church, Inc. v. FCC, 738 F.3d 397, 414 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“[C]able regulations adopted in the era of Cheers and The Cosby Show are ill-suited to a
marketplace populated by Homeland and House of Cards.”).
142. Issie Lapowsky, Down with Cable! Why HBO Is Finally Launching a Standalone Streaming Service, WIRED (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/10/hbo-streamingservice/?mbid=social_twitter.
143. Todd Spangler, Nielsen to Add Mobile Device Viewing to TV Ratings in Fall 2014,
VARIETY (Sept. 19, 2013), http://variety.com/2013/tv/news/nielsen-to-add-mobile-deviceviewing-to-tv-ratings-in-fall-2014-1200649185/.
144. Steven Musil, Netflix Reaches Streaming Traffic Agreement with Comcast, CNET (Feb.
23, 2014), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57619353-93/netflix-reaches-streaming-trafficagreement-with-comcast/. This announcement came on the heels of other news that, pending regulatory approval, Comcast, the largest cable operator in the country, will acquire Time Warner
Cable, the second largest cable operator in the country. Michael Santoli, Comcast and Time
Warner Cable Merger: What It Means for Consumers, YAHOO! FINANCE (Feb. 13, 2014),
http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/daily-ticker/comcast-to-acquire-time-warner-cable143000745.html.
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Broadcasters today are eager to find, and jealously guard, viewers
where they can. And they are invoking all of the legal protections available
to them to ward off emergent networked communications companies.145
What are courts to do now that the traditional model for distributing
premium video is being inverted by a technology that enables individual users to control where, when, and on what device they watch content? The
courts to which the question was posed in the cases involving Aereo and
FilmOn were divided about the scope of the public performance right and
its application to these new forms of video distribution—that is, until the
Supreme Court decided the matter this past summer. Their uncertainty was
no surprise. On the one hand, the language in the Transmit Clause recognizes that transmissions that are delivered to different places at different
times could still be performed publicly within the meaning of the statute.
But the law was also conceived at a time when video distribution was mostly comprised of simultaneous transmissions of live and episodic network
programs. They were public in the colloquial sense; broadcast television
articulated shared cultural and political priorities that were experienced contemporaneously by all viewers. Today, online video subscribers trigger the
“performance” of broadcast programs with a click or tap of their networked
device. In light of the great variety of video programming now available, it
makes little sense to refer to the public in the same sense as broadcast law
posits, at least because “performances” are experienced in a far more fractured and diffuse way than they were just a generation ago.
B. Agencies and the Public Law of Video Distribution Today
The Copyright Act and the Transmit Clause memorialized a hardfought, decades-long legislative settlement concerning powerful interests in
the market for video distribution. Congress enacted the public performance
right under Section 106 and the corollary compulsory licensing regime in
order to settle the conflict between broadcasters and cable operators. In the
four decades since, Congress has incrementally reformed this regime to account for new video distribution technologies as they have emerged. 146

145. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, No. Civ.A. 00-121, 2000 WL 255989
(W.D. Pa. 2000) (holding for broadcast content owners in dispute concerning the public performance of copyrighted programming framed with advertisements obtained by defendants from Toronto to computer users in the United States); see also WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275 (2d
Cir. 2012) (holding that an internet-based video streaming site is not a “cable system” within the
meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 111, the compulsory licensing provisions of the Copyright Act). I use the
term “emergent” or “novel” networked communications throughout to denote the category of
technologies that, while extant and available to users, have not yet been the subject of legal analysis or interpretation by courts.
146. See, e.g., Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999 (Title I of the Intellectual
Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999), 47 U.S.C. §§ 335–338 (2012).
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But the Copyright Act does not comprehensively cover the field.
Congress also has amended the Communications Act consistently since its
enactment in 1934 to define the legal obligations and entitlements of the variety of extant stakeholders in the field of broadcast and video distribution.
Congress, for example, substantially revised the law governing the retransmission of broadcast programming in 1992 in two ways. First, Congress
required cable and direct broadcast satellite service (“DBS”) providers to
carry certain broadcast programming. Second, Congress created for broadcasters a new statutory right to veto cable operators’ unauthorized retransmission of broadcast content. 147 These two provisions—must-carry and retransmission consent—were to work in tandem to improve broadcasters’
market position vis-à-vis cable operators. These changes to the Communications Act adopted the approach that the FCC had employed for decades
before. Congress, moreover, was explicitly mindful that these reforms to
the Communications Act would interact with the public performance right
and the compulsory license regime in the Copyright Act. 148
In this vein, the 1992 Communications Act amendments fill out a legislative field of which the public performance right is just one very small
piece. I show here that the combined history of the public performance
right, the compulsory licensing regime, must-carry regulation, retransmission consent, as well as program access paints the picture of a legal field
that is determined above all by legislation and regulation rather than judgemade law. At every critical juncture in the evolution of the market for video distribution, Congress, the Copyright Office, and the FCC have been the
decisive policymaking bodies, filling in gaps and ambiguities of the governing statutes when novel technologies emerge and the general market circumstances change over time. This Part sets up my argument in Part III
that courts are misguided when they take it upon themselves to elaborate
any single feature of this regime with barely a whisper about this regulatory
context.
1. The Copyright Act
a. Public Performance and the Statutory License
Before 1976, cable operators did not seek the permission of local stations to retransmit broadcast programming. Broadcasters were perfectly
content with this arrangement. They did not really see cable service as a
147. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460; see iCraveTV, 2000 WL 255989 (holding for
broadcast content owners in dispute concerning the public performance of copyrighted programming framed with advertisements obtained by defendants from Toronto to computer users in the
United States).
148. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 338(a)(1) (explicitly referring to 17 U.S.C. § 122 (2012)).
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threat. To the contrary, they believed that cable operators could, at best,
marginally expand viewership. 149 They understood cable television to be
more charity than market disruption.
At least in its early years, it arguably was. The cooperatives and early
operators of what was then called “community antenna television” retransmitted broadcast signals to members and potential viewers who, for a variety of reasons, could not otherwise receive clear signals.150 Their main objective was not to compete with broadcasters. They used large antennas as
well as signaling and amplification technologies to receive over-the-air
broadcast signals that they would otherwise not be able to get.151 Operatives retransmitted those signals by cable (or microwave) to interested
neighbors’ televisions. 152
It was only as cable service became more popular in the 1960s that
broadcasters grew concerned. 153 Under the advertising-based networkaffiliate model of broadcast programming distribution, local stations paid
for network content on the condition that they would be the exclusive purveyors of the content in that given local market. 154 Local stations could
count on monetizing local advertisers’ interest in reaching local audiences.
While they welcomed national advertising, each station cultivated an exclusive relationship with a major broadcast network in order to attract local advertisers. 155 Since local advertisers had no real interest in reaching distant
markets, a station’s decision to enter into an exclusive agreement with a
major network was a simple exercise in arithmetic.
Cable television unsettled this arrangement. A local cable operator reduced broadcasters’ ability to measure the size of their respective local audience for their programming. 156 This was a clear threat for a business
model that depended as heavily as it did (and still does) on the ability to
measure and collect data about audiences.

149. See ROBERT W. CRANDALL & HAROLD FURCHTGOTT-ROTH, CABLE TV: REGULATION
COMPETITION 2 (1996). During this period, moreover, the FCC chose not to regulate cable
retransmission. See Inquiry Into the Impact of Community Antenna Systems, TV Translators, TV
“Satellite” Stations, and TV “Repeaters” on the Orderly Development of Television Broadcasting,
26 F.C.C. 403, 431 (1959) (“[W]e find no present basis for asserting jurisdiction or authority over
CATV’s . . . .”).
150. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390, 391–92 (1968).
151. See generally Olivier Sylvain, Broadband Localism, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 795, 827 (2012).
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d. 348 (9th Cir. 1964).
154. ERIK BARNOUW, THE GOLDEN WEB: A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED
STATES 1933–1953 (1968).
155. Id.
156. MARY ALICE & MAYER PHILLIPS, CATV: A HISTORY OF COMMUNITY ANTENNA
TELEVISION 42 (1972); MARTIN H. SEIDEN, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY ANTENNA
TELEVISION SYSTEMS AND THE TELEVISION BROADCASTING INDUSTRY 44 (1965).
OR
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By the sixties, cable television matured into a line of business for
which viewers were showing a willingness to pay a fee. By the 1970s, cable operators also began to develop their own programs. As such, cable
was disrupting the whole political economy of broadcast distribution. 157
Broadcasters in particular grew concerned that cable operators were
monetizing their original programming without permission or compensation. They accordingly brought suits against cable operators, alleging that
they were, among other things, infringing on their exclusive right to “perform” dramatic works publicly for profit under the 1909 Copyright Act.158
The Supreme Court rejected broadcasters’ claims in two opinions by
Justice Potter Stewart. In Fortnightly v. United Artists 159 in 1968 and Teleprompter v. Columbia Broadcasting System160 in 1974, the Court held that
community access television did not infringe on broadcasters’ public performance rights under the 1909 Copyright Act. 161 Retransmission by cable,
the Court concluded in Fortnightly, was not a public performance within
the meaning of the 1909 law because “the basic function” of the amplification technologies at issue is not unlike anything that the ordinary broadcast
television viewer can do to receive a signal on her own. 162 CATV cooperatives and commercial operators in this sense are “passive beneficiar[ies]” of
broadcasters’ performances; they are not the purveyors of programming as
such. 163
The Court in Teleprompter applied this holding to cable operators that
imported distant (that is, not local) broadcast signals into local markets, interconnected with other area CATV systems, originated their own video
content, and sold advertising. 164 Those operators, it explained, also do not
perform within the meaning of the 1909 Copyright Act. 165 First, the Court
reasoned, it made no difference under the 1909 Act that cable operators had
become entrepreneurial if there was still no “nexus” between these new features and the broadcast content that they retransmitted. 166 Second, the
Court rejected the argument that cable operators transformed into performers within the meaning of the 1909 law when they began importing distant
signals into local areas that would otherwise not receive them. This importation function, the Court explained, does not change the nature of cable
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

See Sylvain, supra note 151 at 827–28.
See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390, 395 (1968).
392 U.S. 390 (1968).
415 U.S. 394 (1974).
Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 400–02; Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 405.
Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 399.
Id. at 398–99.
Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 408.
Id. at 410–12.
Id. at 405.
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service because, as in systems that retransmit local signals to local audiences, it remains a wholly “viewer function.” 167 Broadcasters, it explained,
send their programs out to the public to be received and watched. Cable
operators simply make that content available to viewers.168 The Court was
also not particularly taken by the argument that cable television upsets the
political economy of the advertising-based system of broadcasting. Cable
operators, Justice Stewart observed, only expand broadcasters’ potential
viewer market, and only really affect their relationship with advertisers.169
Having failed in the courts, broadcasters appealed to Congress.170
There, they found a more hospitable forum. This is not to say that Congress
obliged their every request; it did not. Rather, the legislative process, more
than litigation, was far more conducive to resolving the variety of policy
concerns—concerns involving competition, the distribution of free programming, and the protection of local broadcasters.
Legislators, moreover, were already inclined to reform the existing
copyright law. Indeed, by the 1950s, legislators already were considering
ways to update the 1909 Act. 171 By the 1960s, many of the reforms that
would appear in the 1976 statute had already been “hammered out.” 172 Indeed, as early as 1966, members of the House were circulating a version of
a provision that resembles the enacted provision we now call the Transmit
Clause. 173 The report that accompanied the provision at this early stage observed, moreover, that the provision was addressed to transmissions that are
“capable of reaching different recipients at different times, as in the case of
sounds or images stored in an information system and capable of being performed or displayed at the initiative of individual members of the public.” 174 The report made this observation to explain the last clauses of the
Transmit Clause addressed to time and place. 175
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 408.
Id. at 408–09.
Id. at 411–13.
EILEEN R. MEEHAN, WHY TV IS NOT OUR FAULT: TELEVISION PROGRAMMING,
VIEWERS, AND WHO’S REALLY IN CONTROL 45 (2005) (“[V]arious pay-television schemes in the
1960s led the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) and networks to lobby Congress, the
FCC, and the public to protect ‘free television’ from cable’s potential threat.”).
171. See Peter S. Menell, In Search of Copyright’s Lost Ark: Interpreting the Right to Distribute in the Internet Age, 59 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 31 (2011) (“Congress set out to update
the 1909 Copyright Act at various points during the first half of the twentieth century without success.”).
172. Id. at 32.
173. Compare H.R. REP. NO. 89-2237, at 57–58 (1966) (defining “transmit” and “public” under proposed Copyright Act revisions), with 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2012) (defining “publicly” in the
Transmit Clause).
174. H.R. REP. NO. 89-2237, at 58.
175. Id. The congressional report’s description appears to describe the Aereo design. See supra Part I.A. But, to be clear, it does not address individuated recording applications like Aereo’s
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The steady emergence of cable television and the Fortnightly and Teleprompter litigation complicated this legislative work. In those cases, the
Court gave cable operators more leverage than they had before the opinions
were announced. This is what the 1976 Act sought to resolve. As I explained above, in the Transmit Clause, Congress explicitly overturned the
holdings in these Supreme Court cases. 176
Importantly, Congress also set out a compulsory licensing scheme
through which “cable systems” would have to pay a statutorily defined fee
under Section 111. 177 That provision provides that:
secondary transmissions to the public by a cable system of a performance or display of a work embodied in a primary transmission made by a broadcast station licensed by the Federal Communications Commission . . . shall be subject to statutory
licensing upon compliance with the requirements of subsection
(d) where the carriage of the signals comprising the secondary
transmission is permissible under the rules, regulations, or authorizations of the Federal Communications Commission.178
Section 111 defines a cable system in pertinent part as “a facility” that “receives signals transmitted or programs broadcast by one or more television
broadcast stations licensed by the [FCC], and makes secondary transmissions of such signals or programs by wires, cables, microwave, or other
communications channels to subscribing members of the public who pay
for such service.” 179 This legislative arrangement allowed cable operators
to continue to retransmit without having to concern themselves with the
“transaction costs associated with marketplace negotiations for the carriage
of copyrighted programs.” 180 Under this scheme, however, cable operators
would have to pay broadcasters in order to retransmit their programming to
cable subscribers. 181
or FilmOn’s. At most, the report raises questions about the Second Circuit’s analysis of the
Transmit Clause in the Cablevision case, where the defendant cable operator stored broadcast content in its single “information system” and retransmitted those signals “at the initiative of individual members of the public.” Cablevision, 536 F.3d 121, 135 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting H.R. REP.
NO. 90-83 at 29 (1967)).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 94–98.
177. 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (defining public performance: to wit, “to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work . . . to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it
in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times”); Id. § 111 (creating compulsory licensing regime for retransmission of broadcast programming by a cable system).
178. Id. § 111(c)(1).
179. Id. § 111(f)(3).
180. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 11, at 3.
181. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(d). Some broadcasters today would like to see the compulsory licensing regime discontinued. See JOHN BERGMAYER, THE CABLE AND SATELLITE COMPULSORY
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Congress settled on these terms with the specific political economy of
cable retransmission of broadcasting programming in mind. There was
nothing inevitable or objectively optimal about the balance that it struck.
The impetus for legislative intervention was simply that cable service had
become a viable player in the broadcast television market. Congress set out
“[l]imitations on exclusive rights” to retransmit “broadcast programming by
cable.” 182
One can go further and conclude, as the Second Circuit did in Aereo,
that when Congress drafted the Transmit Clause, it did not intend to confer
a sweeping protection to content creators for all time. Rather, legislators
redressed the controversy known to them at the time, explicitly settling on
“a series of detailed and complex provisions which attempt to resolve the
question of the copyright liability of cable television systems.” 183 There
was “no simple answer to the cable-copyright controversy,” the House Report on the bill explained.184 Congress was simply doing the best it could to
find a balanced approach to the existing market for video programming. In
this way, Congress moderated the specific extant interests. Had it sought to
account for any possible iteration of video distribution, it could have said
so. 185
b. The Copyright Office
But Congress did more than define the relative entitlements and duties
of broadcasters and cable operators. Under Section 111, it also delegated to
the Copyright Office the responsibility of administering the licensing regime and, 186 as I show here, refining the balance of interests as communications technologies change and new technologies emerge.
The statute prescribes the conditions under which cable providers may
obtain a compulsory license to retransmit copyright works. The agency’s
role is, on the one hand, quite mundane: it must elaborate the form and content of filings by providers for the purposes of administering compulsory
licensing filings and facilitating payments. 187 This authority is not unlike
the role the agency plays in the administration of licensing for the distribu-

COPYRIGHT
LICENSES
1,
4
(2011),
http://siliconflatirons.com/documents/publications/report/CompulsoryCopyrightLicenses.pdf.
182. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (describing title of section).
183. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 89 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678.
184. Id.
185. Compare id., with Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 101(5), 72 Stat.
731, 737 (defining “aircraft” broadly to include “any contrivance now known or hereafter invented, used, or designed for navigation of or flight in the air”) (emphasis added).
186. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d).
187. See 37 C.F.R. § 201.17 (2000).

Sylvain Final Proof

2015]

DISRUPTION AND DEFERENCE

747

tion of phonorecords of nondramatic musical works as well as the distribution of digital audio under Section 114. 188
The agency’s authority, however, extends far beyond the simple ministerial implementation of licensing regimes. Consider the Register of Copyright’s responsibility to advise Congress and agencies during the consideration of amendments or in light of new developments in the market. 189 In
this capacity, the agency has been integral to Congress’s enactment of copyright-related legislation for decades, including the period before the 1976
Act and before passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in 1998
(“DMCA”). 190 Courts, moreover, are required to seek out the expertise of
the Copyright Office in cases in which the accuracy of information in a
copyright registration statement is contested. 191
The Copyright Office also plays the important role of defining positive
entitlements and duties as changes in communications technologies render
the statutory language more ambiguous over time. They take such action
through interpretive and legislative rulemakings. And courts routinely defer to the agency’s interpretation of provisions of the Copyright Act at times
of dramatic technological change. 192 They have reasoned that Congress intended the Copyright Office to be the “administrative overseer” of the licensing regime under Section 111 in particular because of the characteristic
dynamism of the market for communications technologies at issue in that
statute. 193 No other entity in the federal government is more equipped to
measure disruptive communication technologies against the terms of the
Copyright Act than the Copyright Office.
Importantly, courts, too, have recognized as much. In 2012, a year before it issued its opinion in the Aereo case, the Second Circuit heard an appeal in which ivi, a company that provided web-based video streaming to
users, sought a declaratory judgment that it is a “cable system” within the

188. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2 )& (f).
189. See id. § 701(b)(1)–(2).
190. See, e.g., 144 Cong. REC. 24468 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (statement of Patrick Leahy referring to the “recommendations and hard work of the Copyright Office” in developing the
DMCA).
191. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(2) (“In any case in which inaccurate information . . . is alleged,
the court shall request the Register of Copyrights to advise the court whether the inaccurate information, if known, would have caused the Register of Copyrights to refuse registration.”).
192. See Cablevision v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc., 836 F.2d 599, 609 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (citing DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 577–78 (1956)).
193. Id. at 608; cf. Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 153 F. Supp. 2d 763, 771–72 (E.D. Pa.
2001) (deferring to the Copyright Office’s interpretation of exemption under Section 114 pursuant
to Chevron; explaining that “the Copyright Office could not exercise its duties and functions
without the ability to interpret” the applicable statutory language in the context of new and evolving technologies). See generally 17 U.S.C. § 702 (2012).
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meaning of Section 111. 194 With that designation, ivi would be entitled to
retransmit broadcast signals as long as it pays the statutory fee for the benefit. 195 The Second Circuit rejected the claim, agreeing with broadcasters
that the compulsory licensing provision under Section 111 does not “extend
to Internet transmissions.” 196
The panel also turned to the Copyright Office’s conclusions on the
matter to get a better sense of “Congress’s intent.”197 It did so even though
the agency was not a party to the litigation. Rather, the Copyright Office
had published reports to Congress in which it repeatedly concluded that Internet transmissions do not count as a “cable system” within the meaning of
the compulsory licensing regime under Section 111.198 Indeed, in reports
and testimony to Congress from late 1997 to 2011, the agency had determined consistently that internet streaming is not sufficiently like cable television service to be subject to the compulsory licensing provision.199 Citing
Chevron, the Second Circuit deferred to the Copyright Office’s assessment. 200 The agency’s conclusion, the panel held, was reasonable and not
otherwise barred by the statute. 201 I will return to this case in Part III below.
2. The Communications Act
The Copyright Act is not the only statute through which Congress legislates in the field of video distribution. When it amended the Communications Act in 1992, Congress set out an even more elaborate regime. Among
other things, through that statute, Congress has tasked the FCC with administering a system for awarding licenses to broadcasters and rules that govern
the markets for video distribution and programming.
With this authority, the FCC has had a major, if not decisive, role in
making legal sense of novel video distribution technologies that were not
known to lawmakers in 1934, when Congress first enacted the statute. For
example, as cable television emerged in valley towns across the country in
the late 1940s and 1950s, 202 the agency relied on the Communications Act
to bar cable providers from importing distant broadcast signals into local
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 277–79 (2d Cir. 2012).
See id. at 278–79.
Id. at 282.
Id. at 282–83.
Id. at 283 (citing U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 11, at 188; U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, SATELLITE TELEVISION EXTENSION AND LOCALISM ACT § 302 REPORT 48 (2011)).
199. Id. (citing, inter alia, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, A REVIEW OF THE COPYRIGHT LICENSING
REGIMES COVERING RETRANSMISSION OF BROADCAST SIGNALS 97 (1997)).
200. Id. at 284–85.
201. Id. at 284.
202. Sylvain, supra note 151, at 827.
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markets. 203 Congress ratified the FCC’s general regulatory approach in
1992 amendments to the Communications Act.204 It did so fully mindful of
the public performance right and the statutory licensing regime in the Copyright Act; it observed that the new provisions modify neither “the compulsory copyright license established in section 111” nor “existing or future
video programming licensing agreements between broadcasting stations and
video programmers.” 205 The 1992 statutory amendments reformed the 1976
Act specifically to redress the remarkable shift in market definition caused
by the real explosion of cable television in the 1980s.
Today, the Communications Act and the FCC’s implementation of it
embody the greater part of video distribution law. The FCC, however, has
yet to speak definitively about how provisions of the Communications Act
apply to internet-based video distribution in the way the Copyright Office
has. 206 In this subpart, however, I detail the steps the FCC has taken in this
regard to underscore the extensive scope of existing public law in this area.
I argue that courts should routinely incorporate, or at least acknowledge in
their analyses of the current generation of video streaming cases, this expansive regulatory arrangement.
a. Retransmission Consent and Must-Carry
From the late-1940s to the mid-1960s, the FCC chose to impose a regulatory light touch on the new cable operator upstarts that were emerging
across the country. The common view then was that “community antenna
television,” as it was called, supplemented broadcasting by relaying signals
to low-lying valley communities. 207 It did not matter that the new video
distribution technology complicated the network-affiliate broadcast model
of video distribution. The presumption (now, understood as a conceit) was
that broadcasting could never really be displaced by the upstarts. Broadcasters in this early period did not have any doubt about their importance as
public trustees of the airwaves.
By the mid-1960s, however, as cable service spread, the common wisdom changed. Cable was clearly becoming more than a supplement to
broadcasting; it had become a gatekeeper to many local markets and a po-

203. Id. at 829.
204. 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(1) (2012) (“No cable system or other multichannel video programming distributor shall retransmit the signal of a broadcasting station . . . .”).
205. Id. § 325(b)(6); see also 17 U.S.C. § 111(b) (2012) (“[T]he secondary transmission to the
public of a performance or display of a work embodied in a primary transmission is actionable as
an act of infringement.”).
206. See supra notes 186–201 and accompanying text.
207. See Sylvain, supra note 151, at 827.
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tential competitor on video programming itself. It was displacing the centrality of broadcasting.
The FCC responded by promulgating rules that required cable operators to obtain the agreement of local stations to carry signals to subscribers
in the local market. 208 The agency also imposed pricing regulations on cable operators on the theory that they could abuse their new gatekeeping position in local markets by charging subscribers unreasonably high rates.209
Cable companies of course resisted these changes on the grounds that the
FCC did not have the statutory authority to regulate them—that they were
not broadcasters within the meaning of the Communications Act.210 The
agency had argued that it could regulate cable service because it is ancillary
to a service it otherwise has the authority to regulate—broadcasting. 211 The
Supreme Court affirmed the agency’s interpretation.212
In 1984, a little more than a decade and a half later, Congress lifted
these FCC regulations in local areas where there was “effective competition.” The FCC subsequently defined this term broadly, allowing cable
providers to operate in most local markets free from price regulation. The
consequence of the 1984 amendment and its implementation by the FCC
was a decade of high subscriber rates for cable service. 213
By the early 1990s, as consumer worries about the rate of increase in
cable prices intensified, broadcasters and consumer groups agitated for
more protective legislation. They set their sights on an amendment to the
Communications Act that would effectively enlarge broadcasters’ leverage
vis-à-vis cable operators and other “multichannel video programming distributors” (“MVPDs”). 214 The common view was that cable providers,

208. See, e.g., Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459, 465 ¶ 17 (1962) (denying
transmitter permit application); Authorizations in the Bus. Radio Serv. for Microwave Stations to
Relay TV Signals to Cmty. Antenna Sys., No. 14895, Grant of Authorizations in the Domestic
Public Point-to-Point Microwave Radio Serv. for Microwave Stations Used to Relay TV Broad.
Signals to Cmty. Antenna TV Sys., No. 15233, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 796–97 (1966) (adopting rules
and regulations). See generally LELAND JOHNSON, TOWARD COMPETITION IN CABLE
TELEVISION (1994); Charles Lubinsky, Reconsidering Retransmission Consent: An Examination
of the Retransmission Consent Provision (47 U.S.C. § 325(b)) of the 1992 Cable Act, 49 FED.
COMM. L.J. 99, 102 (1996).
209. See United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
210. See id. at 172.
211. Id.
212. See id. at 181.
213. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, § 2(a)(1), 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (“Since rate deregulation, monthly rates for the lowest
priced basic cable service have increased by 40 percent or more for 28 percent of cable television
subscribers. . . . The average monthly cable rate has increased almost 3 times as much as the Consumer Price Index since rate deregulation.”).
214. Nicholas W. Allard, The 1992 Cable Act: Just the Beginning, 15 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 305, 336-37 (1993).
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who, unlike broadcasters, had no positive responsibility to attend to the
public interest, were drowning out free, over-the-air programming. 215
This push for reform succeeded. Legislators came to believe that, in
spite of the 1976 compromise, broadcasters were airing content with disproportionately little benefit in return.216 Cable operators now controlled
access to local markets and reaped all of the advantages of the content that
broadcasters were supplying. This, according to the Senate Committee Report on the bill that eventually became the new law, unsettled the very
foundation of over-the-air broadcasting. 217 Free video programming, the
Report explained, should never be “replaced by a system which requires
consumers to pay for television service.” 218 The new law would give
broadcasters a new entitlement that they could use as leverage in negotiations with MVPDs over retransmission terms. Among other things, for example, broadcasters and other content providers could negotiate to add new
channels that providers would otherwise not carry. 219
Among other things, the Cable Television Consumer and Competition
Act of 1992 requires cable operators to carry local broadcasters’ signals to
local audiences if the local station elects to forgo negotiating on retransmission consent terms. 220 Under the new law, moreover, cable operators cannot receive compensation for carrying local broadcast signals when a local
broadcaster elects to be a must-carry station. 221 If, however, a broadcaster

215. Id. at 335.
216. S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 35 (1991), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1168 (observing that “the Committee . . . does not believe that public policy supports a system under which
broadcasters in effect subsidize the establishment of their chief competitors.”); see also Federal
Communications Commission, Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, 8 FCC Rcd. 2965, 3004–05 (1993) (determining that the 1992 Cable
Act “created a new communications right in the broadcaster’s signal, completely separate from
the programming contained in the signal.” (emphasis added)).
217. S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 29, as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1168.
218. Id. at 30, as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1169.
219. Id. at 29, as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1168–69; see also 138 CONG. REC. S64201 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992) (statement of Sen. Daniel Inouye) (“S. 12 permits the two interested
parties—the station and the cable system—to negotiate concerning their mutual interests. It is of
course in their mutual interests that these parties reach an agreement.”).
220. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act § 6; 47 U.S.C.
§ 325(b)(1)(B) (2012) (retransmission consent provision which also creates exception for mustcarry provision at 47 U.S.C. § 534(a) (2012)). The must-carry provisions essentially require cable
service providers to carry a minimum number of broadcast signals based on the relative size of the
local market. 47 U.S.C. § 534(a).
221. 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(10). There are a variety of reasons that would compel a broadcaster
to elect must-carry over retransmission consent. See generally CHARLES B. GOLDFARB,
RETRANSMISSION CONSENT AND OTHER FEDERAL RULES AFFECTING PROGRAMMERDISTRIBUTOR NEGOTIATIONS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
REPORT RL34078(2007), available at http://stuff.mit.edu/afs/sipb/contrib/wikileaks-crs/wikileakscrs-reports/RL34078.pdf.
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elects to proceed under the retransmission consent regime, cable television
providers must settle on retransmission terms with broadcasters. In the absence of an agreement, the prior may not retransmit the latter’s signal. Indeed, they must remove that broadcaster’s signal from their offerings and,
moreover, may not import the distant signal of another affiliate within the
same network.
Crucially, this must-carry requirement rests on the popular faith (and,
now, fiction) that “television broadcasting plays a vital role in serving the
public interest.” 222 The Supreme Court later ratified this view when, in response to a First Amendment challenge by cable operators, it held that the
must-carry provisions are content-neutral and justified by a legitimate government interest in providing free, over-the-air public interest programming
to consumers. 223 Congress, the Court explained, decided that pay television
could never displace this model.
Of course, in today’s market, this account about free, over-the-air
broadcasting is more romance than reality, as fewer people every year rely
on television antennas to watch broadcast programs. 224 Most viewers subscribe to cable or use their internet connection to watch programming at a
time and place that is convenient.225
In any event, Congress found broadcasting important enough to renew
the retransmission consent and must-carry provisions in 1999 and expanded
them to cover direct broadcast satellite providers.226 The result is that, today, broadcasters are assured that cable operators and satellite providers
will carry their signal. In this regard, the 1992 Act has done precisely what
its proponents hoped; it has given broadcasters more leverage in their negotiations with MVPDs.
These new entitlements, however, have introduced an important new
wrinkle in the political economy of video distribution. Ever since 1992,

222. S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 30 (1991), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1174.
223. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 224 (1997).
224. See Amendment of the Commission’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, 76 Fed.
Reg. 17071, 17072 (proposed Mar. 28, 2011) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 76) (“Since Congress
enacted the retransmission consent regime in 1992, there have been significant changes in the video programming marketplace.”). But see Emily Steel, After Supreme Court Ruling, Aereo’s Rivals
TIMES
(June
29,
2014),
in
TV
Streaming
Seize
Opening,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/30/business/media/after-supreme-court-ruling-aereos-rivals-intv-streaming-seize-opening.html.
225. Cf. Agape Church, Inc. v. FCC, 738 F.3d 397, 414 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“[C]able regulations adopted in the era of Cheers and The Cosby Show are ill-suited to a
marketplace populated by Homeland and House of Cards.”).
226. See 47 U.S.C. § 335(b)(5)(A) (2012) (defining the term “provider of direct broadcast satellite service”); id. §§ 338, 614 (2012); see also Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999
(Title I of the Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999), Pub. L.
No. 106-113, Appendix I, § 1009(a), 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A-537–38.
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broadcasters and other video content producers have routinely held-up popular time-sensitive programming (like major professional sports events)
when it comes time to negotiate new retransmission terms. 227 They do so to
extract additional commitments from operators, including the promise to
carry new or unpopular channels or to pay more per-subscriber fees for the
channels they do carry. 228
Recognizing this moral hazard, in 1999 amendments to the Communications Act, Congress required the FCC to ensure that broadcasters negotiate with cable and satellite providers in good faith.229 Congress later imposed the “good faith” obligation on the cable operators and broadcasters a
few years later. The agency has yet to use this authority, however, to protect subscribers from the game of chicken that broadcasters play with cable
operators whenever retransmission terms are up for renewal. Congress is
considering an array of reforms in light of the lack of action from the FCC
on the “good faith” provision. The Video CHOICE (Consumers Have Options in Choosing Entertainment) Act, for example, would put an end to
broadcast networks’ blackouts during contract negotiations over retransmission terms. 230 This proposed bill would also forbid broadcasters from leveraging their popular networks to force cable operators to carry affiliated
but less popular cable networks. 231
b. Program Access
Must-carry and retransmission consent represented significant reforms
to video distribution law. Like the public performance right and the statutory license, however, they comprise only a fraction of the whole public law
in the legislative field of video distribution. Congress in 1992 also amended the Communications Act to prohibit MVPDs from “engag[ing] in unfair
227. See, e.g., Ted Johnson, DirecTV Refuses to ‘Bail Out’ Time Warner Cable in Dodgers
Standoff, VARIETY (July 29, 2014), http://variety.com/2014/tv/news/dodgers-tv-standoff-timewarner-cable-says-yes-to-arbitration-but-directv-doesnt-bite-1201270994/; Chloe Albanesius, Cablevision Sues Viacom Over Channel Bundling, PC MAGAZINE (Feb. 26, 2013),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2415967,00.asp.
228. See, e.g., Albanesius, supra note 227; David Wharton, PGA Championship faces CBS
blackout for Time Warner Cable customers, LA TIMES (Aug. 7, 2013),
http://www.latimes.com/sports/sportsnow/la-sp-sn-pga-championship-cbs-television-blackout20130807,0,7602876.story#axzz2bNyTEHFj.
229. 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(3)(C)(ii).
230. H.R. 3719, 113th Cong. (2013); cf. Joe Flint, Proposed Bills Seek to Rewrite Media
TIMES
(Dec.
12,
2013),
Rulebook,
L.A.
http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-proposed-bills-media-rules20131212,0,2826769.story#axzz2nIXEN9ut.
231. Another bill, the Next Generation Television Marketplace Act, would reform retransmission consent and compulsory licensing rules. H.R. 3720, 113th Cong. (2013). Cf. Alex Ben
Block, “Two Bills Introduced in Congress to Stem TV Blackouts,” HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Dec.
12, 2013), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/two-bills-introduced-congress-stem-665429.
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methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”232 The
statute further requires the FCC to implement program access regulations
that elaborate on this restriction.233
Of course, as the statute was drafted in the early 1990s, it is not clear
whether Congress meant to include online video distributors within the
scope of the statute. The statute defines an MVPD as:
a person such as, but not limited to, a cable operator, a multichannel multipoint distribution service, a direct broadcast satellite
service, or a television receive-only satellite program distributor,
who makes available for purchase, by subscribers or customers,
multiple channels of video programming. 234
While the list in the definition is helpful, it is only illustrative; it is not exhaustive of covered providers. It therefore leaves the legal obligations
owed by and to the variety of emergent online video providers today in legal limbo, at least for now.
The difficulty in the statute is in its reference to “channels.” The question is whether online video providers supply “multiple channels of video
programming” in the same way that cable providers do within the meaning
of the Communications Act? 235 The FCC has had the occasion to answer
the question in the context of a dispute arising out of a video programmer’s
decision to prematurely terminate its licensing arrangement with Sky Angel, an operator of a subscription service that distributes the content of television networks in real time to televisions equipped with internet-connected
set-top boxes. 236 The agency has tentatively rejected Sky Angel’s complaint about the termination, explaining that, based on the evidence before

232. 47 U.S.C. § 548(b).
233. Id. § 548(c). See generally 47 C.F.R. § 76 (1998), (FCC rules governing competitive
access to cable programming).
234. 47 U.S.C. § 522; see also 47 C.F.R. § 76.1000(e) (defining MVPD as “an entity engaged
in the business of making available for purchase, by subscribers or customers, multiple channels
of video programming”).
235. See 47 U.S.C. § 522(13). Most notable among the newest generation of upstarts is Sky
Angel, an operator of a subscription service that distributes the content of television networks in
real time to televisions equipped with internet-connected set-top boxes. The company enters into
contracts with broadcasters and other video content producers like Discovery and Disney, for example, to supply content to its subscribers who, in turn, can watch the programming on their television as it hits the airwaves. In this way, Sky Angel provides a service that is similar to that of
traditional cable operators. The significant difference is that, even while their subscribers watch
the programs on high-definition televisions, Sky Angel transmits the programming to subscribers
over the Internet.
236. Sky Angel U.S., LLC, 25 FCC Rcd. 3879, 3880 ¶ 4, 3883 ¶ 7 (2010) (emergency petition
for temporary standstill). The video programmer involved in the dispute, Discovery Holding
Company, qualifies as a competitor MVPD because its owner has a significant stake in such companies. See News Corp., 23 FCC Rcd. 3265, 3273 ¶ 12 (2008) (noting the stakes of Discovery’s
officers and directors in a competing MVPD, Liberty Media Corporation).
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it, “Sky Angel does not provide its subscribers with a transmission path,” as
the agency has interpreted the word.237 But the agency’s conclusion, again,
was tentative; it was only replying to Sky Angel’s request for a “temporary
standstill” of the arrangement between it and Discovery, the content provider involved in the dispute. The FCC has yet to enter a final order in the
case.
This is no surprise. The language of the statute is not clear. Nor, as in
Aereo, is it clear what the correct answer ought to be as a matter of law. Indeed, since the dispute raises novel questions about a disruptive technology
that the pertinent statute and regulations could not anticipate, the FCC in
2012 opened a proceeding in which it invited public comment on the scope
of the program access rules. 238 That proceeding and the adjudication that
instigated it remain open today, to the frustration of Sky Angel, which recently had to suspend its video distribution services. 239 There is little question that there are substantial competition concerns at stake. 240 But, again,
it is not at all evident in the language of the statute or pertinent regulations
how these disputes ought to be resolved as a matter of existing law. All
eyes now are on the FCC to resolve the question.
All of this work deserves far more consideration than courts were willing to give it in the public performance cases. It is one thing to ask courts
to be more respectful, and another to determine how they should implement
that deference as a matter of course. I take up that challenge in Part III below.
III. DISRUPTION AND DEFERENCE
As I show above, in Part II, the task of determining whether unlicensed
online video streaming of free, over-the-air broadcast programming infringes on broadcasters’ public performance rights is complicated. It cannot be
done well simply by examining the plain text or specific legislative history
of the Transmit Clause. The pertinent statutes are like pieces of a 1,000piece jigsaw puzzle. Each piece furthers a specific objective that complements the others. 241 Putting the pieces together, however, requires
237. Sky Angel, 25 FCC Rcd. at 3883 ¶ 7.
238. Media Bureau, 27 FCC Rcd. 3079, 3082 ¶ 6 (Mar. 30, 2012) (notice).
239. See Supplemental Comments of Sky Angel U.S., LLC, Nos. 12-80 & 12-83, (F.C.C. June
10, 2014), available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7521313509.
240. Consider that Sky Angel has brought antitrust claims against other video programmers
who have also prematurely terminated their arrangements with the online video provider. The
D.C. Circuit dismissed Sky Angel’s claim against the National Cable Satellite Corporation for
pulling C-SPAN from its lineup, but only because Sky Angel did not plead sufficient facts to establish “concerted action,” not because the motivating concerns were not anticompetitive. See
Sky Angel v. Nat’l Cable Satellite Corp., 947 F. Supp. 2d 88, 101–02 (D.D.C. 2013).
241. See supra Part II.B.
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knowledge of where the others fit. Congress gave to the Copyright Office
and the FCC the assignment of making sense of these various pieces when
new technologies emerge.
In the recent cases involving Aereo and FilmOn, however, federal
judges did not convey anything but unwavering confidence in their institutional capacity and authority to determine the scope of the Transmit
Clause. 242 The courts interpreted the provision, unbothered by the various
provisions and agency interpretations that bear on the question.
In this Part, I propose that judges be far more mindful of their institutional authority and capacity than they have been in this setting. Scholars
have studied the relative roles that courts, legislators, and agencies play
when reviewing controversies across substantive areas associated with networked information technologies. They have not, however, directed the
same attention to defining the courts’ authority or capacity to resolve disputes as complex and agency-involving as video distribution. This Part rectifies this silence by drawing on principles in administrative law doctrine.
A. Judicial Deference Generally
There are two basic reasons for deference in judicial interpretation of
public law. First, courts consider deferring when they assume that there is a
nontrivial risk that they might make a mistake about the substantive issue in
dispute. Even if their epistemic error can later be cured, their intervention
could be destabilizing in the interim. Accordingly, a court will defer if it
also believes that another institution (that is, a legislature, an agency, or
standard-setting organization) has a greater institutional capacity or expertise to make the right decisions in the given subject matter. Thus, A will
elect to abide by B’s prior conclusion on the same question even though A
might have resolved the issue differently in the first instance.243 Implicit in
this conception is the recognition that A always has the freedom to decide
whether it should defer to the prior decision by B, but that B is far likelier to
get it right in the first instance.244
The second reason for deference is institutional. Deference in these
cases is an explicit recognition that certain institutions are by design responsible for enacting a limited range of laws or rules in the first instance. This
means A will defer to B because the former is A and the latter is B. 245 It

242. See supra Part I.D.
243. See Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1072
(2008).
244. See id. at 1075.
245. See Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (“We have
long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s con-
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does not matter whether B is, from A’s perspective, right or wrong as a substantive matter. 246
Separation of powers and democratic legitimacy are constitutional
principles that impose formal limits on judges’ authority to make legal decisions irrespective of what the best substantive resolution is.247 The concept
of separation of powers associates each of the branches of government with
a specific and mutually exclusive role in federal governance. This structural arrangement reflects the negotiated balance reached during the founding
period as well as a more general view of how constitutional democracies
ought to function. 248
Democratic legitimacy, on the other hand, requires constituencies to
validate the public laws by which they must abide. Under this conception,
the elected branches are presumed to be superior to courts at resolving contested policy questions. 249 They are accountable to, and representatives of,
defined constituencies. 250 At least theoretically, elections are the mechanisms through which elected officials stay in tune with constituents’ interests. Federal courts, on the other hand, have no such constituencies and, as
a result, no obligation to heed majoritarian demands on substantive outcomes. Independent agencies are generally sheltered from the vagaries of
electoral politics, but not as removed (or antimajoritarian) as courts are by
design. They, like elected officials, are better able to “set[] the dimensions
of social policy that may involve trades among the interests of broad groupings of citizens,” while “judges’ strengths lie in resolving discrete controversies between individuals, in which one wins, another loses, and broad
social adjustments are secondary to the outcome of their concrete dispute.” 251
The doctrine of judicial review of agency action in administrative law
embodies these two background constitutional norms: separation of powers
and democratic legitimacy. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Chevron v.
Natural Resources Defense Council 252 stands as the principle statement on
these two norms. Under the Chevron doctrine, judges defer to agencies’

struction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations.” (footnote omitted)).
246. See id. at 845.
247. Id. at 842–45.
248. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 629–30 (1952) (Douglas, J.,
concurring); see also JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, §§ 143–44, 150,
159 (Simon & Brown 2012) (1690).
249. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66.
250. Id.
251. Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial Controls over Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1257 (1992).
252. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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substantive implementation of ambiguous statutes on the assumption that
the agency officials who have been thinking longest and most systematically about the given problem are likely to have the most prudent policy solution. 253 To be sure, courts will reject the agency action when it conflicts
with congressional intent. 254 But courts will defer to an agency’s judgment
if they find that the agency action at issue reasonably accommodates competing interests, “the regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves reconciling conflicting policies.” 255 These elements are
characteristic of the work that many agencies undertake. It is presumably
for this reason that judicial reversals of agency action under Chevron are
much less frequent than judicial affirmation.256
Public choice critiques have not diminished Congress’s continued delegation to agencies and courts’ concomitant deference to agency action. 257
To the contrary, Congress continues to delegate a wide range of responsibilities to agencies; agencies, in turn, have developed a variety of regulatory
tools to implement legislative priorities. 258 Among other things, agency officials collect information about fields as they change, report on those findings to legislators and other policymakers, and adapt laws to changing circumstances. Agencies are generally well-equipped to undertake these
responsibilities in spite of concerns about regulatory capture and selfdealing. 259
Courts accordingly honor the various forms through which agencies
implement public law by deferring, or at least respecting, the latter’s efforts
as a matter of course. That is, courts have not adopted a one-size-fits-all regime of deference after Chevron. Instead, they tailor their scrutiny of agency action to each case and legislative field. Under current doctrine, the level of deference courts give to agencies falls somewhere along a spectrum or

253. Id. at 865–66.
254. See, e.g., Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 634–35 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
255. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (footnotes omitted).
256. Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron
Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why it Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 696 n.91
(2007).
257. See, e.g., City of Arlington, Texas v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874–75 (2013) (holding that
courts must defer under Chevron to an agency’s determination that it has jurisdiction to interpret
an ambiguous statute). See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture
Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 17–18 (2010).
258. See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 227–31 (2001) (discussing when Chevron deference applies).
259. See Barkow, supra note 257.
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“continuum.” 260 The level of deference given depends on the agency action
under scrutiny, the specific statutory authority on which the agency bases
its action, and the relative or unique institutional expertise the agency has
brought to bear. 261 On one end of this spectrum, there are cases in which
courts ignore, are indifferent to, or are altogether skeptical about the agency’s interpretations generally. These are cases where Congress has unambiguously decided not to confer lawmaking authority to an agency or where
courts have traditionally assumed the authority to decide this kind of dispute in the first instance.262 In these cases, courts apply a “pragmatic, multi-factored methodology” that considers “statutory text and the whole act;
legislative history and statutory purpose; the evolution of the statute
through judicial and other precedents; and substantive policy canons.” 263
At the other end are cases involving a statute through which Congress has
delegated primary and nearly exclusive lawmaking authority to an agency.
In these latter cases, courts assume a far more deferential posture.264 But
the amount of deference a court gives to an agency can vary widely, from
“consultative” to “super deference,” depending on the nature of the authority at issue. 265
In the context of video distribution, Congress delegated specific authority to the Copyright Office and FCC. These agencies are tasked with
calibrating the implementation of the Copyright Act and the Communications Act, respectively, as new and unanticipated technologies emerge.
Over the years, Congress has given these agencies broad authority to make
legal sense of new technologies in the first instance. I outline those duties
here, based on my account in Part II.
Reporting. Both agencies are explicitly charged with the task of collecting information from stakeholders about the state of affairs in video distribution. That is, they collect information about prevalent market uses,
consumer habits, judicial interpretations, and emergent technologies. They
play this role, again, because there is only so much that Congress can do in
this legislative field. In any event, agencies are far better equipped and
staffed to collect such information. But Congress also has charged both
agencies with the responsibility of reporting their findings to legislators,

260. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretation from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083,
1089–90 (2008).
261. Id. at 228.
262. See infra Part III.B (discussing electronic surveillance).
263. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 260, at 1117.
264. See infra Part III.B (discussing broadband network management).
265. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 260, at 1098–99.
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other federal agencies, and, on request, to courts. This role is precisely the
sort of task an agent for Congress should undertake. 266
Adapting Current Laws. Both agencies also have the authority to
promulgate rules and offer guidance on substantive questions when the
governing statute is ambiguous or unclear. They do this in ways that Congress, as a practical matter, simply cannot. Above, in Part II, I discussed at
least two examples that showcase this important feature of their responsibilities administration: first, the FCC’s rulemakings addressed to cable operators and broadcasters in the 1960s and, second, the Copyright Office’s consistent determination over the course of the past decade and a half that ininternet transmissions are not included in the compulsory licensing regime.
In both cases, the agencies promulgated a rule or interpretation to fill a legislative gap until Congress formally amends the old statute or enacts a new
one to resolve a substantive ambiguity occasioned by the emergence of a
disruptive new video distribution technology like online streaming.
Convening. Hand-in-hand with the responsibility of collecting information is the important role both agencies have in convening discussions
and negotiations between the various stakeholders in the field. Congress
has given to the FCC in particular broad authority to arbitrate or mediate
disputes. In this capacity, the FCC is best positioned to understand the relative priorities of service providers, consumer advocacy groups, and technologists. The FCC’s rulemaking proceedings also operate as opportunities
for the various stakeholders to convene formally. The agency, in turn, relies on the exchange of ideas to formulate policy that is presumably reflective of the various rival interests.
Expertise. Finally, over the years, the Copyright Office and the FCC
have developed a uniquely deep understanding of the nature of communication markets. The FCC in particular has lawyers, economists, and technologists on staff to elucidate new developments and trends. The Copyright
Office, on the other hand, operates as a convener, a research arm for Congress, and an administrator for licensing regimes across substantive areas.
Both agencies have acquired this deep level of knowledge in ways that exceed anything close to what Congress or the courts have.
Together, these various activities paint a picture of broad responsibility. Over time, Congress has actively chosen to give the Copyright Office
and the FCC substantial power to make sense of new communications technologies as they emerge. Because Congress has given the FCC and the
266. While the Copyright Office has the responsibility to report to Congress and the courts on
copyright related matters, it is a subordinate agency within the Library of Congress. See 17
U.S.C. § 701(a) (2012). The current Register of Copyrights and her predecessor are on record as
advocating the restructuring of the Copyright Office as an independent agency. See Letter of Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights, to Representative John Conyers, Jr. (Mar. 23, 2015).
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Copyright Office these powers, courts have accordingly afforded deference
to those agencies on the scope of video distribution law.
B. Judicial Deference and Communication Technologies
Institutional authority and capacity are not the only justifications for
judicial deference. Different substantive areas warrant different kinds of
expertise. In the context of copyright law, courts are reluctant to expand
existing copyright protections to novel communication technologies “without explicit legislative guidance.”267 The Supreme Court affirmed this principle in Sony v. Universal City Studios. 268 In Sony, it found that manufacturers of videocassette recorders are not secondarily liable for viewers’ rereproduction of copyright protected television programs. 269 It determined
that users generally record those programs for their personal use (that is,
they “time-shift”). 270 The Court held that these “substantial noninfringing
uses” do not cause the requisite level of harm to the copyright owners. 271
The Sony Court explained that judges are generally less capable of
“accommodat[ing] fully the varied permutations of competing interests that
are inevitably implicated by such new technology” than Congress is. 272 It
cited the well-established view “that the protection given to copyrights is
wholly statutory.” 273 The Court noted that this is why courts have been reluctant “to expand the protections afforded by the copyright without explicit
legislative guidance.” 274
The 1976 Copyright Act itself is evidence of this interaction between
courts and Congress. The Sony Court cited Teleprompter and Fortnightly,
both overturned by the Act, as cases that triggered a legislative fix to the
statutory public performance right.275 Courts accordingly, the Sony Court
noted, must err on the side of caution before broadening protections.
“Sound policy, as well as history,” the Court explained, “supports our consistent deference to Congress when major technological innovations alter

267. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984) (citing, inter alia,
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 415 U.S. 394 (1974) and Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390 (1968)); see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 965 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 431).
268. 464 U.S. 417, 446–47.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 449–50.
271. Id. at 456.
272. Id. at 431.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. (citing, inter alia, Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 415 U.S. 394 (1974)
and Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390 (1968)).
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the market for copyrighted materials.” 276 It asserted as much even as the
fair use analysis is characteristically fact-intensive and best suited to adjudication. 277
But, to be sure, the reasoning in Sony is not what most students of administrative law generally associate with the idea of deference. As I outlined above, deference, at least as it comes up in administrative law doctrine, refers to the posture courts assume when Congress has charged an
agency with interpreting or implementing the statutory regime at issue in a
case. Sony was not about that kind of deference. The dispute in Sony concerned a question—the scope of the fair use defense 278—that courts have
assumed the responsibility of resolving in the first instance. 279 But it was
during the course of its fair use analysis that the Court explicitly secondguessed its own capacity and institutional authority to stretch the law to apply to the new technology at issue.280 It expressed this reticence as deference to Congress.
That same principle should have applied in the cases involving Aereo
and FilmOn, but it did not. Indeed, after reading Aereo, one might think
that courts need not be so deferential to Congress or agencies generally
when they adjudicate disputes involving novel communication technologies. In their opinions, neither Justice Breyer nor Justice Scalia for a second considered whether the Court was the right forum to decide in the first
instance whether the Transmit Clause reaches online video streaming—a
technology that was unknown to most people until just a few years ago. 281
Their assumption was that courts have the authority to and are capable of
276. Id.; cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 190 (2000) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (“[O]ne might claim that courts, when interpreting statutes, should assume in close
cases that a decision with ‘enormous social consequences’ should be made by democratically
elected Members of Congress rather than by unelected agency administrators.” (citation omitted)).
277. See Monge v. Maya Magazines, 688 F.3d 1164, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4901) (C.C.D. Mass 1841)). The fact-specific nature of the fair
use analysis remains a point of great consternation for many courts, scholars, and practitioners
because of how unpredictably and inconsistently it has been applied. See, e.g., Dellar v. Samuel
Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam) (noting that “the issue of fair
use . . . is the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright”); 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN
ON COPYRIGHT § 12.1 (2013); see also Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1105, 1106–07 (1990); Mazzone, supra note 9, at 398–403; David Nimmer, “Fairest of
them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 287 (2003); Parchomovsky & Weiser, supra note 9, at 126–28.
278. Sony, 464 U.S. at 447–51.
279. But see Mazzone, supra note 9, at 414–15.
280. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 430 (“Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference to Congress when major technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional authority and the institutional ability to accommodate fully
the varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new technology.”).
281. See supra Part I.D.
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resolving such disputes by simply examining no more than the statutory
provision in dispute.
This proposition sounds right for two reasons. First, Congress has not
delegated to any agency the authority to implement the Transmit Clause in
the way it has delegated administrative authority to implement other statutory provisions like, for example, Section 111 of the Copyright Act. Second, courts cannot abdicate their positive responsibility of adjudicating disputes brought before them. At a minimum, they must resolve whether a
case is justiciable in the first place. They must decide, for example, whether there is a ripe controversy worthy of their attention or whether they have
jurisdiction to hear the matter. They cannot defer those questions to any
other institution.
More generally, courts routinely decide how to interpret contested
terms without consulting other institutions. They decide which resources or
kinds of authorities are worth considering and following. Courts decide, for
example, whether and to what extent legislative history or other evidence of
congressional intent matters when determining the scope of a substantive
right or obligation.282 They do this as a matter of interpretive judicial philosophy ex ante 283 or because, pursuant to the statutory provision at issue,
they must consider certain legislative factors in their analysis. 284 Or they
decide that they should review certain agency actions in a certain way. 285
That is, pursuant to their native duty to say what the law is, they devise
standards of judicial review and deference to account for constitutional or
institutional considerations unmentioned in the legislation at issue.286
We might assume that it is with this background in mind that the
courts in the cases involving Aereo and FilmOn appeared to have taken it as
an article of faith that they could and should decide what Congress meant
by including the term “publicly” in the definition of performance in the
Transmit Clause. But the decision about how to interpret contested terms is
not as obvious or unimportant as the Aereo opinions’ silence on the matter
suggests. In cases involving disruptive networked communications tech282. Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1266 (2011) (“Those of us who make use
of legislative history . . . .”).
283. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, SCALIA & GARNER’S READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012).
284. See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, 484–85 (1951) (discussing
standards under the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (2012)).
285. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980
(2005); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001); Universal Camera, 340 U.S.
at 487.
286. See generally GELLHORN & BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 927 (Strauss et. al eds.,
2011) (discussing Clarke Byse, Scope of Judicial Review in Informal Rulemaking, 33 ADMIN. L.
REV. 183, 193 (1981) and Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, Perspectives in Administrative
Law, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 771, 780–81 (1975)).
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nologies generally, courts routinely convey humility, or at least selfawareness, about the limits of their institutional authority or capacity.
Much more recently, courts have done this in cases involving issues as
disparate as electronic communication surveillance by law enforcement officials on the one hand, and broadband network management practices of
internet service providers on the other. As to electronic surveillance, courts
have not hesitated to say in the first instance what the Fourth Amendment
allows. 287 Yet, even in this area, the Supreme Court has wrung its hands
demonstrably about whether it or Congress is better suited to defining the
scope of privacy protection in cases involving technologically novel surveillance techniques. 288 They do this notwithstanding their uncontroverted
exclusive authority to interpret constitutional provisions. 289 They even have
invited Congress to provide guidance on how to define privacy in recent
cases involving surveillance techniques that rely on novel networked communications technologies like location tracking. 290 And, yet, at the same
time, courts have recognized that they are at the peak of their institutional
authority when they are asked to resolve disputes about the substantive
scope of a constitutional right. Outside of a narrow range of statutes
through which Congress has delegated policymaking authority to federal
law enforcement officials to define the contours of statutory privacy
rights, 291 agencies do not have an articulated responsibility to define the
scope of protection from electronic surveillance under the Fourth Amendment. 292
The governance of local internet service providers, on the other hand,
is very different from the governance of law enforcement surveillance techniques. Importantly, local broadband network management is not a constitutional matter. As technologies change, the FCC implements the objectives set out in the Communications Act through a wide range of regulatory

287. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see
also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–
35 (2001).
288. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring).
289. See Olivier Sylvain, Failing Expectations: Fourth Amendment Doctrine in the Era of Total Surveillance, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 485, 512–14 (2014).
290. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[C]oncern about new intrusions
on privacy may spur the enactment of legislation to protect against these intrusions.”). Justice
Alito flatly observed in his concurring opinion in Jones that, “in circumstances involving dramatic
technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative.” Id. at 964.
291. See, e.g., Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414,
108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended in sections of 18 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.).
292. Of course, this is not to say that agencies do not have some rulemaking authority on privacy law outside of law enforcement surveillance. See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996); Patient Safety and Quality
Improvement Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-41, 119 Stat. 424 (2005).
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activities. 293 Nevertheless, the federal courts have not hesitated to define or
reflect on the obligations of internet service providers under the Communications Act. 294 They have done so, however, within the bounds of transsubstantive deference doctrines and administrative law doctrine generally. 295
Courts have decided that the agencies to which Congress has delegated authority are best situated to interpret the pertinent statutory terms.
As to both areas, electronic surveillance and broadband network management, courts are always explicitly mindful of the limits of their relative
institutional authority and capacity. Scholars of these two areas in particular, too, have attended to the courts’ relative institutional role.296
C. Towards a Theory of Implied Delegation in Video Distribution Law
1. Deference in Action
Should we treat the Transmit Clause as a provision that courts have the
exclusive responsibility of elaborating in the first instance (like the Fourth
Amendment)? 297 Or is it more like a provision in a regulatory regime that a
federal agency has the delegated authority to administer (like that set out in
the Communications Act)? Or does it fit somewhere in between?
Chevron does not really answer those questions, but another canonical
Supreme Court case in modern administrative law doctrine provides important guidance. In United States v. Mead,298 the Supreme Court identified
the various considerations that judges must generally take into account
when deciding whether to defer or what level of deference courts should
give to agencies. 299 The Mead Court held that courts must inquire into how
293. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 154(i), 157, 1302(a) (2012); see also id. § 201(b) (authorizing the
agency to “prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry
out” provisions of the statute).
294. See, e.g., Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 635 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Comcast Corp. v. FCC,
600 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
295. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981–84, 991
(2005) (applying Chevron to agency interpretation of definitional terms in Communications Act);
cf. City of Arlington, Texas v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1870–72 (2013) (applying Chevron to agency interpretation of jurisdictional provision).
296. See generally Kerr, supra note 9; Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126
HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1958 (2013); Sylvain, supra note 151, at 795; Olivier Sylvain, Internet Governance and Democratic Legitimacy, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 205, 259–61 (2010).
297. To be sure, the Copyright Clause in the Constitution does not engage courts in the way
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement does. The latter enlists courts to measure executive
overreach. The former, on the other hand, explicitly authorizes Congress to “promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts” by setting “limits” on creators’ exclusive rights to their copyrighted
works. U.S. CONT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. But that structural difference went unnoticed in the majority
and dissenting opinions in Aereo.
298. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
299. Id. at 227–34.
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and whether Congress intended to delegate to the Customs Office the authority to implement the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States
before scrutinizing the validity of the agency’s action.300 If a court finds no
such intention, then it will be less deferential than required under Chevron. 301 Courts only have to consider “the thoroughness” of the agency’s
analysis, “the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to control.” 302
After Mead, one of the key questions for federal courts is whether
Congress has one way or another delegated to the agency at issue the authority to interpret and administer an ambiguous provision with the “force
of law.” 303 Deference—whether obedience or simply weighty consideration—will depend on whether the agency’s interpretation is “made in pursuance of official duty” and premised on “more specialized experience and
broader investigations and information than is likely to come to a judge in a
particular case.” 304
This inquiry, sometimes called Chevron Step Zero, 305 must come before the reviewing court analyzes the substantive merits of the agency action at issue. The Court in Mead explained that an agency can manifest its
expertise in a “great variety of ways.” 306 Depending on what the governing
statute allows, an agency may manifest congressional intent by rulemaking,
adjudication, enforcement, or any other number of methods. 307 Courts,
meanwhile, must be prepared to honor “the spectrum of possible agency action” that Congress has permitted. 308 Deference, the Court explained, must
be “tailor[ed]” to the variety of forms that agency action may take. 309 Otherwise, courts would be unresponsive to the range of regulatory strategies
that Congress pursues to further complex legislative purposes. 310 Mead in
this regard encourages agencies to be flexible in undertaking their delegated
authority and, just as importantly, requires courts to consider the “variety of
ways” in which Congress may have implicitly delegated to an agency the

300.
301.
(2000).
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

Id. at 226–28; see also Brand X, 545 U.S. at 983 (discussing Mead).
Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–28; see also Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 586–87
Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
Id. at 226–27, 229.
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139.
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 193 (2006).
Mead, 533 U.S. at 235–36.
Id. at 236.
Id.
Id.
See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44 (1993).
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power to implement the statute at issue.311 This rule does not compromise
judicial authority to scrutinize agency action, as much as impose on courts
the sensible duty of being self-aware of the limits of their interpretive authority. 312 The doctrine has courts choose between obeying the agency interpretation at issue, treating the agency view on the matter as a “constituent
element[] of its own decision, as persuasive if not controlling,” or “as simply irrelevant.” 313
2. An Alternative to Indifference in Aereo
The various courts that heard the recent disputes involving Aereo and
FilmOn did not consider the question of whether they ought to consult legal
analysis of online video distribution by the Copyright Office or the FCC.314
In their silence, the courts seemed to presume that they alone have the authority or capacity to define the scope of protection under the Transmit
Clause.
As a formal matter, they are not necessarily wrong. Congress did not
explicitly delegate the authority to interpret the Transmit Clause to any institution and, under current doctrine, federal courts are not obliged to apply
Chevron deference to an agency interpretation unless Congress manifests an
intention to authorize that agency “to be able to speak with the force of
law.” 315 Neither the Copyright Office nor the FCC have an explicit obligation under the Copyright Act to fill gaps in the Transmit Clause or promulgate binding legal rules that interpret the public performance right. It is
likely for this reason that courts did not convey any doubt that they could
ignore statements by the Copyright Office or the FCC on how to treat
online video distribution. 316 For the courts, those agencies are no more than
ladies-in-waiting, to be ignored until a litigant challenges their interpretations in court.
But existing doctrine, especially after Mead, does not require that
courts be inattentive to agency interpretations of public law in fields about
which Congress has assumed that they are expert. 317 While there is no ex311. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1003–05
(2005) (Breyer, J. concurring) (discussing Mead).
312. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944); see also Mead, 533 U.S. at 234
(quoting Skidmore).
313. Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 822–23 (2001).
314. See supra Part I.D.
315. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229.
316. The matter would have been different if the litigants had argued or briefed the point.
317. Cf. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27, 229 (“It can be apparent from the agency’s generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress would expect the agency to be
able to speak with the force of law when addressing ambiguity in the statute or fills in a space in
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plicit delegation of authority to interpret the Transmit Clause, one can infer
from the Copyright Act that the Copyright Office has the authority to make
sense of that provision when new technologies emerge. This seems especially sensible in the video distribution context, where the Copyright Office
and the FCC have been, and must be, very active.
As I explained above, pursuant to legislative command, 318 the Copyright Office and FCC have issued reports and administered proceedings on
how disruptive emergent online video streaming applications are and
whether they square with the terms of current law.319 To be sure, these
agencies have not had the occasion (never mind the explicit authority) to
say anything about how or whether unauthorized online video streaming of
broadcast programming infringes broadcasters’ public performance right
under the Transmit Clause. But the Copyright Office and the FCC have
committed substantial resources and their expertise to the general question
on which the Aereo majority rested its holding: whether online streaming is
like cable television service. Before the Court decided Aereo, both agencies
decided that online video distribution is not sufficiently like cable to warrant protection under at least two other related provisions under the Copyright Act and the Communications Act.320
It is peculiar that existing doctrine could allow courts to ignore the
substantial efforts that the Copyright Office and the FCC have expended on
the point. At a minimum, nothing in Mead or administrative law doctrine
generally forbids courts from entertaining their conclusions.
One might even assume that current administrative law doctrine empowers courts to consider agency interpretations of related provisions in the
legislative field. There are at least two reasons for this. First, courts defer
to agency interpretations even when they are not a party to the litigation before them. This is true across different substantive areas, including matters
related to the Aereo and FilmOn video distribution applications. Consider
again the ivi case. 321 In ivi, in a dispute concerning the scope of coverage of
the compulsory licensing provision, the Second Circuit deferred to the Copyright Office’s repeated determination that online video applications are not
like cable and, therefore, not entitled to a compulsory license to retransmit

the enacted law, even one about which Congress did not have intent as to a particular result.
When circumstances implying such an expectation exist, a reviewing court must accept the agency’s position if Congress has not previously spoken to the point at issue and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.”); see also Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139.
318. See supra Part II.
319. See supra Part III.A.
320. See supra Part II.B.
321. See supra notes 192–199 and accompanying text; see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms.
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
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broadcast programming. 322 The panel reached this conclusion even though
the Copyright Office was not a party to the litigation. The agency’s delegated authority and expertise in the legislative field were enough to warrant
deference. 323
Second, in Mead, the Court sought to accommodate the variety of
ways in which Congress grants authority to agencies. 324 Sometimes Congress delegates to agencies the responsibility of promulgating rules that carry the force of law. Courts will give such agency actions Chevron deference. Sometimes, however, Congress allows agencies to make “interpretive
choices” that do not bind judges. 325 Even in these cases, courts defer, conveying something between “near indifference” to simple respect to “substantial deference.” 326 In any event, the specific features of the agency action shape the “fair measure of deference” that courts choose to give. 327
The question in any such case is whether the agency’s interpretations bear
any of the hallmarks of authority and expertise worthy of consideration.
I accordingly propose here a framework for judicial interpretation of a
statutory provision that is separate but intertwined with a general regulatory
regime in which Congress has delegated administrative or lawmaking responsibilities to an agency. The occasion for this kind of judicial review
would be, as in Aereo, a dispute between private parties about the applicability of an ambiguous provision to a novel technology otherwise regulated
by the agency. The agency’s interpretation would be entitled to consideration to the extent it has authority to interpret a significantly related statutory
provision. 328
Under the approach I propose here, the judicial inquiry about how far
the public performance right reaches would not begin and end with an analysis of the Transmit Clause or related provisions in the Copyright Act.
Courts also would as a matter of course consider whether the Copyright Office or the FCC has determined whether a new video distribution technology is too unfamiliar (too disruptive) to fall within the ambit of the compul322. WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 283–84 (2d Cir. 2012).
323. Id. Or consider a decision from just this past term in which the Court, in determining the
reach of a provision in the Federal Labor Standards Act, gave considerable consideration to the
Department of Labor’s approach to “similar” concerns even though it was not a party to the litigation. Integrity Staffing Solutions v. Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513, 517–18 (2014); id. at 520 (Sotomayor,
J., concurring) (citing Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)).
324. United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001).
325. Id. at 227.
326. Id. at 228 (quoting Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Cent. Lincoln Peoples’ Util. Dist., 467 U.S.
380, 389–90 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
327. Id. Courts look “to the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of [its] position.” Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944)).
328. See supra Part III.B.
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sory licensing, must-carry, retransmission consent, or program access
laws—or, in the terms on which the Aereo court relied, whether those agencies have decided whether video streaming is like cable or not.
Attending to all of the public law of video distribution—legislation
and agency action in the field—would best effectuate congressional intent.
After all, the governing statutes reflect Congress’ decision that the balance
of the diverse interests in the market for video programming distribution
ought to be resolved in the first instance by the Copyright Office and the
FCC. Legislators concluded that those agencies are best situated to assess
the efficacy of current law in light of new innovations. It charged those
agencies with the responsibility of keeping abreast of changes in the market, reporting those findings to Congress, and promulgating binding regulations when necessary to effectuate legislative intent. These are the very
kinds of regulatory interventions to which the Court has pointed to justify
routine judicial deference to agencies. 329
Courts of general jurisdiction do not have the same claim to expertise
or institutional authority under these circumstances.330 Nor can courts administer the careful policy balance embodied in video distribution law in
the way that those agencies do on a case-by-case basis. Of course, courts
have an important role to play. If neither Congress nor the pertinent agencies have determined (or can agree on) how or whether any provision applies to a particular dispute, they should employ the full sweep of interpretive tools to make sense of the law at issue as they normally would—that is,
as the majority and dissent did in Aereo. Courts in these cases would do so
based on the assumption that they are the first to address the question generally or that, in their protracted silence, Congress and the agencies expect
as much from the courts. 331 In this regard, my proposal does nothing to diminish public law interpretation by courts.
But when the Copyright Office or the FCC has determined that a new
technology is too disruptive to justify applying a related provision in the
Copyright Act or the Communications Act, 332 as they have here, courts
329. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139.
330. Compare courts of general jurisdiction to the various specialized courts, including the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Tax Court. See also Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2120 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring) (disavowing
portion of majority’s opinion in patent case that addressed the “fine details of molecular biology”
because he could not “affirm those details” on the basis of his personal knowledge or belief).
331. Then again, it is unlikely that sudden technological disruptions and shifts in the market
like the one the United States is experiencing today for video distribution will remain unaddressed
by Congress or agencies. Congress is considering at least two bills that would be addressed directly to online video streaming. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
332. See, e.g., WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 283–84 (2d Cir. 2012)(considering, and
then giving deference to, the Copyright Office’s interpretation of 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)’s compulsory
licensing scheme).
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ought to defer to or at least consider that prior agency interpretation, apart
from whether it would produce a different result. In this regard, my proposal would inject a degree of humility and discipline to the interpretive
endeavor that to this point has been sorely missing in this legislative
field. 333 More generally, it would be a corrective to the sense of interpretive
exceptionalism in judicial interpretation.
As it relates to judicial review of disputes concerning the application
of the public performance right to online video streaming, my proposal
would require courts to make several inquiries. Courts should take into account whether the Copyright Office or the FCC has considered whether the
emergent technology is covered by compulsory licensing, retransmission
consent, must-carry, or program access laws before proceeding to an analysis of the scope of broadcasters’ public performance rights. If neither agency has spoken on the matter, I propose that courts engage in a de novo analysis of the applicability of the public performance right as they would a
provision that no single agency has the responsibility of administering or
implementing. If, however, the Copyright Office or the FCC has indeed determined one way or another how or whether a corollary provision applies
to the new technology at issue, I would require courts to defer to that agency’s interpretation as a matter of course.334
IV. CONCLUSION
Online video streaming applications have turned the traditional broadcast model inside out. Users today control what and how they watch video
programming. These services are so different today from what existed just
a generation ago that, until a divided Supreme Court decided the matter last
term, courts did not agree on how such services square with existing law.
Courts were uncertain, for example, about whether the new technologies are
sufficiently novel not to be covered under the public performance right, a
provision that Congress included in the 1976 Copyright Act specifically to
address the unique political economy of cable retransmission of broadcast
programming.
Today, at a time when so much in the market for internet-based applications and services is contested, I argue here that courts should be far more
careful in their application of the public performance right to disruptive
technologies like online video streaming than they have been. Instead, they
should defer to the agencies to which Congress has delegated the authority

333. See supra Part I.D.
334. This deference could not be any greater than what is required under Chevron, but I do not
offer here any firm proposal on the level of deference to which agencies would be entitled under
these circumstances. I leave this question to a future project.
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to interpret interacting provisions under the Copyright Act—that is, to all of
the public law that Congress has set in motion. Courts, of course, should
continue to be at their most searching when they are asked to interpret a
provision that they have the authority to define in the first instance. But
they also should be far more careful when they are asked to make sense of a
provision in a complex legislative field for which Congress has given to
agencies the primary responsibility of updating and implementing during
dramatic times of change.

